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FIREARMS, EXTREME RISK, AND LEGAL DESIGN: “RED FLAG” 
LAWS AND DUE PROCESS 
Joseph Blocher* & Jacob D. Charles** 
Extreme risk protection order (“ERPO”) laws—often called “red flag” 
laws—permit the denial of firearms to individuals who a judge has 
determined present an imminent risk of harm to themselves or others. 
Following a wave of adoptions in the wake of the Parkland murders, 
such orders are now authorized by law in nineteen states and the 
District of Columbia and under consideration in many others. 
Advocates argue that they provide a tailored, individualized way to 
deter homicide, suicide, and even mass shootings by providing a tool 
for law enforcement or others to intervene when harm appears 
imminent, without having to wait for injury, lethality, or criminal 
actions to occur. But the laws have also garnered criticism and have 
become a primary target of the Second Amendment sanctuary 
movement. 
As a matter of constitutional law, the most serious questions about 
ERPO laws involve not the right to keep and bear arms but due process. 
Such orders—like domestic violence restraining orders, to which they 
are often compared—can initially be issued ex parte, and critics often 
allege that this feature (and others including the burden of proof) raises 
constitutional problems.  
This Article provides a comprehensive analysis of the applicable due 
process standards and identifies the primary issues of concern. It 
concludes that, despite some variation, current ERPOs generally 
satisfy the relevant standards. It also notes those features that are likely 
to give rise to the strongest challenges. The analysis both builds on and 
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suggests lessons for other areas of regulation where laws are designed 
so as to lessen extreme risk.  
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INTRODUCTION 
What process is due when people who pose an extreme risk of harm to 
themselves or others are temporarily deprived of a constitutional right? 
What design choices can legislators make to ensure that such deprivations 
provide constitutionally adequate protections?  
Although such questions have arisen in many different contexts, 
including domestic violence restraining orders and civil commitments, 
they are now front and center for what is arguably the most important 
current development in firearms regulation: the spread of “extreme risk” 
or “red flag” laws that permit courts to order that firearms be temporarily 
removed from individuals who pose an imminent risk of harm to 
themselves or others. Advocates see these laws as an effective, targeted 
way to save lives while respecting the Second Amendment.1 Critics allege 
that they amount to “pre-crime” punishment and that they violate not only 
 
1 See infra Section I.A. 
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the right to keep and bear arms but also the due process guarantee.2 In 
fact, opposition to extreme risk laws has helped fuel the “Second 
Amendment sanctuary” movement, by which some local governments 
have pledged their refusal to enforce state and federal gun laws.3  
Behind the political claims lies an enormously important and difficult 
set of questions regarding the ways in which the law can be 
constitutionally designed to account for risky-but-not-criminal behavior. 
Judges and scholars have long recognized that laws regulating on the basis 
of future risk raise a different and in many ways harder set of questions 
than those that, for example, punish prior behavior.4 On the one hand, the 
law often restricts behavior on the basis of predictions. Even basic cost-
benefit analysis—which is foundational to the regulatory state5—is 
largely forward-looking. Regulation of risk, in short, is nothing new.6  
But when such regulation intersects with constitutional rights and 
interests in the absence of a criminal conviction or its equivalent, harder 
questions arise about the necessary procedures and evidentiary burdens. 
Intuitively, restraining a person who has harmed others is different from 
restraining someone who is only at risk of doing so. There is no bright 
line: civil commitments, restraining orders, and the like all impose 
 
2 See infra note 159 and accompanying text (“pre-crime” comparison); infra notes 81–88 
and accompanying text (Second Amendment critique); infra notes 29–30 (due process 
critique). 
3 Noah Shepardson, America’s Second Amendment Sanctuary Movement Is Alive and 
Well, Reason (Nov. 21, 2019, 4:00 PM), https://reason.com/2019/11/21/americas- 
second-amendment-sanctuary-movement-is-alive-and-well/ [https://perma.cc/XKV7-ADF4]; 
see also Scott Pelley, A Look at Red Flag Laws and the Battle Over One in Colorado, 60 
Minutes, CBS News (Nov. 17, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/red-flag-gun-laws-a-
standoff-in-colorado-60-minutes-2019-11-17/ [https://perma.cc/GF5D-BSH2] (examining 
Second Amendment sanctuaries in Colorado).  
4 Both categories, of course, may well be based on prior behavior—in the former set, that 
behavior is evidence of future risk; in the latter, it is the basis for retribution or some other 
governmental interest.  
5 See Richard L. Revesz & Michael A. Livermore, Retaking Rationality: How Cost-Benefit 
Analysis Can Better Protect the Environment and Our Health 9–10 (2008) (noting that the use 
of cost-benefit analysis has been a contentious issue in regulatory policy making for decades); 
Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit Revolution 3–4, 6–7 (2018) (describing how successive 
Presidents since Ronald Reagan have required that regulations promulgated during their 
administrations be justified on a cost-benefit basis). 
6 Nor, for that matter, is the notion that regulation often involves trading off one risk against 
another: denying a firearm to a particular person might lower the risk that he will misuse it, 
while raising the risk that he will be unable to defend himself in a time of need. For an 
influential analysis of the tradeoff question, see Risk Versus Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting 
Health and the Environment 3–5 (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995). 
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significant restraints in an effort to prevent future harms and are not 
categorically unconstitutional. Scholars have explored those related 
contexts7 but have only recently devoted attention to these questions in 
the context of extreme risk laws,8 and this Article is the first to provide an 
in-depth examination of the due process issues they raise. (These are often 
called “red flag” laws, though that label might convey a stigma, so we 
will use the increasingly common “extreme risk” label.9)  
In the past two years alone, a dozen states have adopted or expanded 
such laws. Although the details vary, their form is similar: law 
 
7 For a sampling of the literature regarding involuntary commitments for mental illness, see 
David L. Bazelon, Institutionalization, Deinstitutionalization and the Adversary Process, 75 
Colum. L. Rev. 897, 899–900 (1975) (asking “[i]s confinement on the basis of 
‘dangerousness’ alone constitutional?” and providing a skeptical answer); Veronica J. 
Manahan, When Our System of Involuntary Civil Commitment Fails Individuals with Mental 
Illness: Russell Weston and the Case for Effective Monitoring and Medication Delivery 
Mechanisms, 28 Law & Psych. Rev. 1, 32 (2004) (“Civil liberty concerns, as evidenced by 
the extensive due process protections afforded to those facing involuntary commitment, and 
the state’s interest in protecting all of its citizens, are fundamentally at odds.”); Alexander 
Tsesis, Due Process in Civil Commitments, 68 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 253, 300–01 (2011) 
(arguing that civil commitment should require a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of 
proof).  
Scholars have also explored due process protections as they apply to domestic violence 
restraining orders (“DVROs”) and similar legal restrictions. See, e.g., Shawn E. Fields, 
Debunking the Stranger-in-the-Bushes Myth: The Case for Sexual Assault Protection Orders, 
2017 Wis. L. Rev. 429, 484 (arguing that sexual assault protection orders—which are different 
from DVROs—“should employ the lower preponderance-of-the-evidence standard to ensure 
that victims have an effective mechanism to seek prospective relief and governments have an 
effective tool in combating the sexual assault epidemic” and stating “[h]owever, procedural 
due process may require a more nuanced approach with respect to the types of evidentiary 
showings necessary to meet this standard and with the types of prospective relief available to 
petitioners”). 
8 Timothy Zick, The Constitutional Case for “Red Flag” Laws, Jurist (Dec. 6, 2019, 8:39 
PM), https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2019/12/timothy-zick-red-flag-laws/ [https://perm 
a.cc/G3TS-L53G]. Other scholars have looked at the due process implications of other types 
of similar statutory mechanisms, like DVROs with specific firearm prohibitions, Aaron 
Edward Brown, This Time I’ll Be Bulletproof: Using Ex Parte Firearm Prohibitions to Combat 
Intimate-Partner Violence, 50 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 159, 196–98 (2019) (arguing that 
domestic violence ex parte orders for protection that prohibit firearm possession can survive 
due process challenges), or laws designed to disarm those in the throes of severe mental health 
crises, Fredrick E. Vars, Symptom-Based Gun Control, 46 Conn. L. Rev. 1633, 1646–47 
(2014) (arguing that a law allowing temporary firearm removal from individuals suffering 
delusions or hallucinations would not violate due process). None, so far, has assessed the new 
spate of extreme risk laws passed predominantly in the last two years. 
9 See Red Flag Laws: Examining Guidelines for State Action: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Ronald Honberg, Senior Policy Advisor, 
National Alliance on Mental Illness) (describing the risk that “red flag” language can 
stigmatize individuals with mental illness). 
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enforcement officers or sometimes family members or other professionals 
can petition a court for an extreme risk protection order (“ERPO”)10 that 
would require a person to surrender his or her firearms and refrain from 
acquiring new ones. After receiving the petition, the court can enter a 
short-term, ex parte ERPO if the petitioner carries his or her burden of 
proof (which can range from showing “good cause” to “clear and 
convincing” evidence11). After a full, adversary hearing—at which 
petitioner again bears the burden of proof—the court can enter a lengthier, 
but still temporary, ERPO.12  
Politically and empirically, it is easy to see why such laws are 
increasingly popular. They provide tailored, individualized risk 
assessments, rather than regulating people’s access to firearms based on 
their membership in broad classes like felons or the mentally ill.13And 
although scholars are just beginning to evaluate the effectiveness of these 
new laws, early studies have shown encouraging results.14 This all points 
to ERPOs being an increasingly important part of the debate about gun 
rights and regulation going forward.  
Of course, there are critics. Some argue that extreme risk laws violate 
the right to keep and bear arms.15 These critics challenge the very notion 
of a law that allows disarming individuals who have not committed any 
crime. District of Columbia v. Heller, after all, said the Second 
Amendment “elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, 
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”16  
 
10 In California, the order is known as a “gun violence restraining order” or “GVRO.” Cal. 
Penal Code § 18100 (Deering Supp. 2020).  
11 See infra notes 302–09 and accompanying text; see also infra Section II.B (discussing 
constitutional principles for establishing burden of proof and how they should apply in the 
ERPO context).  
12 See infra note 309 and accompanying text.  
13 See infra Subsection I.B.1. 
14 See infra notes 70–82 and accompanying text. That extreme risk laws might be effective 
does not make them a panacea, nor should they distract from other forms of effective gun 
regulation. See Joseph Pomianowski & Ling Liang Dong, Red Flag Laws Are Red Herrings 
of Gun Control, Wired (Sept. 9, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/red-flag-laws-
are-red-herrings-of-gun-control/ [https://perma.cc/PSN8-B2UK]. 
15 Ivan Pereira, Lawmaker Introduces ‘Anti-Red Flag’ Bill in Georgia To Combat Gun 
Control Proposals, ABC News (Jan. 15, 2020, 12:52 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/-
US/lawmaker-introduces-anti-red-flag-bill-georgia-combat/story?id=68299434 [https://perm 
a.cc/7V9S-7CMX] (describing legislation introduced in Georgia to forbid extreme risk laws 
that bears the title “Anti-Red Flag—Second Amendment Conservation Act”).  
16 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (emphasis added). 
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The focus on the right to keep and bear arms is unsurprising, given the 
magnetic pull of the Second Amendment in nearly any political or legal 
discussion of gun regulation; the tendency is often to evaluate any 
proposed rule related to firearms for its conformity with that right in 
particular.17 But a myopic focus on the Second Amendment unnecessarily 
flattens the gun debate and minimizes different—and often stronger—
constitutional claims.18 More generally, it demonstrates the importance of 
firearms law and scholarship which consider how gun rights intersect with 
other constitutional rights, including those emanating from the First,19 
Fourth,20 and Fourteenth21 Amendments.22  
In this increasingly rich and diverse area of constitutional law, 
scholarship, and rhetoric, due process has a particularly notable role to 
play. Consider the debate over “No Fly No Buy,” which would have 
forbidden gun purchases by those on the federal terror watch list. The 
 
17 See generally Joseph Blocher, Gun Rights Talk, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 813 (2014) (arguing that 
the invocation of the Second Amendment in debates over proposed gun control laws has 
defeated many of these measures).  
18 A federal court in California, for example, blocked on First Amendment grounds a Los 
Angeles law that would have required city contractors to disclose ties to the NRA. As the NRA 
put it, the “First Amendment Defends the Second.” See First Amendment Defends the Second, 
NRA-ILA (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.nraila.org/articles/20191216/first-amendment-
defends-the-second [https://perma.cc/L5TF-6PVS]. 
19 See, e.g., Timothy Zick, Arming Public Protests, 104 Iowa L. Rev. 223, 236–37 (2018) 
(considering, inter alia, the First Amendment rights of speech and assembly and their 
interaction with the Second Amendment); Luke Morgan, Note, Leave Your Guns at Home: 
The Constitutionality of a Prohibition on Carrying Firearms at Political Demonstrations, 68 
Duke L.J. 175, 179, 211–13 (2018) (same).  
20 See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, The Right To Remain Armed, 93 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1, 4–5 (2015) 
(considering implications for search and seizure). 
21 See, e.g., Pratheepan Gulasekaram, “The People” of the Second Amendment: Citizenship 
and the Right to Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1521, 1538 (2010) (illustrating and analyzing 
the difficulties of limiting “the people” to non-citizens). 
22 Not only do these other rights and interests intersect with the Second Amendment in 
important ways, but the courts have also borrowed from many of these frameworks when 
fleshing out the contours of the right to keep and bear arms. See Jacob D. Charles, 
Constructing a Constitutional Right: Borrowing and Second Amendment Design Choices, 99 
N.C. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 1–2) (on file with the Virginia Law Review) 
(describing how courts and commentators have borrowed from other constitutional rights 
domains in creating a framework for the Second Amendment).  
COPYRIGHT © 2020 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
2020] Firearms, Extreme Risk, and Legal Design 1291 
proposal had broad23 and bipartisan24 political support. Some critics 
predictably argued that it violated the Second Amendment,25 but as a 
matter of doctrine the more serious objections had to do with due 
process.26 Partly as a result, the proposal ultimately died in the Senate.27 
A similar dynamic seems to be at work with ERPOs, except that the 
consequences are far more important, since such laws have been widely 
adopted.28 Although the Second Amendment continues to draw much of 
the attention, the more substantive and pressing concern is whether 
ERPOs violate gun owners’ due process rights. When the Senate held a 
hearing in 2019 about possibly providing federal incentives for state 
extreme risk laws, due process concerns were front and center.29 Indeed, 
in some areas of the states that have adopted extreme risk laws, local 
officials have vowed not to implement them. One Colorado sheriff put the 
critique bluntly: “This is the only bill I know of that allows law 
enforcement officers to take somebody’s property without due process.”30  
But, of course, that assumes the answer to the central question: do 
extreme risk laws provide due process? If so, then “due process” 
objections should be recognized for what they are: political rhetoric, 
 
23 See, e.g., Press Release, Quinnipiac Univ., Overwhelming Support for No-Fly, No-
Buy Gun Law, Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds; Support for Background Checks 
Tops 90 Percent Again (June 30, 2016), https://poll.qu.edu/national/release-
detail?ReleaseID=2364 [https://perma.cc/C74J-XGWG]. 
24 David M. Herszenhorn, Bipartisan Senate Group Proposes ‘No Fly, No Buy’ Gun 
Measure, N.Y. Times (June 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/22/us/politics/ 
senate-gun-control-no-fly-list-terrorism.html [https://perma.cc/4J99-TKVT]. 
25 See, e.g., Chris W. Cox, Gun Laws Don’t Deter Terrorists: Opposing View, USA Today 
(June 14, 2016, 1:01 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/06/13/gun-laws-
deter-terrorists-opposing-view/85844946/ [https://perma.cc/Q6S7-9C52].  
26 See Hina Shamsi & Christopher Anders, The Use of Error-Prone and Unfair Watchlists 
Is Not the Way To Regulate Guns in America, ACLU (June 20, 2016, 2:45 PM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/washington-markup/use-error-prone-and-unfair-watchlists-not-
way-regulate-guns-america [https://perma.cc/YA9S-NYBS]; see also Joseph Greenlee, No 
Fly, No Buy (And No Due Process), Federalist Soc’y (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.fed-
soc.org/blog/detail/no-fly-no-buy-and-no-due-process [https://perma.cc/V4U6-7ERV]. 
27 Lisa Mascaro & Jill Ornitz, Senate Rejects New Gun Sales Restrictions, L.A. Times, June 
21, 2016, at A8. 
28 See infra Section I.A (describing the spread of extreme risk laws).  
29 Marianne Levine, Senate GOP Open to States Allowing Narrow Gun Restriction, Politico 
(Mar. 26, 2019, 1:05 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/26/senate-republicans-
state-gun-law-reform-1237446 [https://perma.cc/F32F-F6EQ]. 
30 Governor Polis Signs ERPO Into Law, Delta Cnty. Indep. (Apr. 17, 2019), 
https://www.deltacountyindependent.com/governor-polis-signs-erpo-into-law-cms-15033 
[https://perma.cc/S2N7-NW6M]. 
COPYRIGHT © 2020 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
1292 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 106:1285 
rather than doctrinal claims.31 If not, then no amount of political or 
empirical support will suffice, and this promising new avenue of gun 
regulation will be shut down by the courts. 
This Article examines that question. Part I explains the spread and 
substance of current extreme risk laws. The wave of new extreme risk 
laws has encountered opposition from those who claim, often with little 
attention to the details of the different statutory regimes and the variety 
among them, that they violate due process. Part II lays out the relevant 
requirements of due process and applies that framework to the extreme 
risk context. Such an analysis can, we hope, be useful to lawmakers, 
litigants, judges, and scholars interested in designing or evaluating the 
constitutionality of extreme risk laws. Although we do not undertake an 
exhaustive or individualized assessment of various state laws, we 
conclude that the basic structure of existing extreme risk laws satisfies the 
requirements of due process.  
The point of the analysis, however, is not to provide a blanket 
constitutional defense of extreme risk laws. The goal instead is to identify 
and explore an engaging set of constitutional issues raised by a new wave 
of firearm regulations. Those issues, in turn, are relevant to our 
understanding of how the Constitution intersects with risk regulation, and 
what options society has to protect itself from potential harms.  
I. EXTREME RISK LAWS: REFRAMING GUN REGULATION 
To understand the constitutional stakes of extreme risk laws, it is 
important to begin with a basic understanding of why and how they have 
been adopted and what design choices legislators face in drafting them. 
This Part therefore provides a brief overview of the policy and legal issues 
and highlights two features that arguably represent a paradigm shift for 
gun regulation: first, the fact that they involve individualized assessments, 
and second, the fact that they can apply even to the “law-abiding, 
responsible citizens” that District of Columbia v. Heller suggests are the 
 
31 To be clear, we do not suppose that there is a bright line between “constitutional” and 
“political” claims—constitutional law and argument often occur outside the courts, and in fact 
the Second Amendment provides an especially robust and interesting example in that regard. 
See Jacob D. Charles, The Right To Keep and Bear Arms Outside the Second Amendment 7 
(Feb. 23, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Virginia Law Review).  
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core class of people covered by the Second Amendment.32 These features 
have important implications for the due process analysis in Part II. 
A. The Spread of Extreme Risk Laws 
Debates about gun rights and regulation have commanded an immense 
amount of political and legal attention over the past few years, and the 
spread of extreme risk laws at the state level has been one of the most 
important developments in gun law and policy during that period. Such 
laws are designed to fill gaps in the existing regulatory infrastructure, and 
to provide targeted, evidence-based interventions before gun risks 
translate into gun harms.  
Laws have long forbidden particular classes of persons to purchase or 
possess guns—those who have committed a serious crime or been 
adjudicated mentally ill, for example.33 But such laws, like any 
categorical regulation, may be both overbroad and underinclusive with 
regard to the concrete risks of gun violence.34 Mental illness, to take one 
obvious example, is a poor proxy for future violent behavior, making that 
class undeniably overbroad.35 Indeed, despite the intense public focus on 
mental illness as a cause of mass shootings, the link is much more 
attenuated than is commonly assumed.36 On the other hand, a person with 
a newly-manifesting mental health crisis might present a heightened risk 
 
32 See infra Subsection I.B.2 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 
(2008)). 
33 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2018) (listing classes of prohibited persons). 
34 Some such prohibitions are sometimes justified on grounds other than risk, such as 
denying weapons to those deemed “unvirtuous.” See, e.g., Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 
336, 348 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 684–85 
(7th Cir. 2010)) (“[M]ost scholars of the Second Amendment agree that the right to bear arms 
was tied to the concept of a virtuous citizenry and that, accordingly, the government could 
disarm ‘unvirtuous citizens.’”); Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The 
Early American Origins of Gun Control, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 487, 491–92 (2004). 
35 See, e.g., Jeffrey Swanson et al., Violence and Psychiatric Disorder in the Community: 
Evidence from the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Surveys, 41 Hosp. & Cmty. Psychiatry: J. 
Am. Psychiatric Ass’n 761, 769 (1990); Consortium for Risk-Based Firearms Policy, Guns, 




36 James L. Knoll IV & George D. Annas, Mass Shootings and Mental Illness, in Gun 
Violence and Mental Illness 81, 81 (Liza H. Gold & Robert I. Simon eds., 2016).  
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of gun violence despite never having been adjudicated mentally ill, 
making the class underinclusive as well.37 
Extreme risk laws provide a way for guns to be quickly and temporarily 
taken away from a person who does not necessarily fit into a prohibited 
class, but is at risk of harming himself or others. As the name indicates, 
therefore, their focus is on individualized risk itself, not rough status 
proxies for risk.38 Although extreme risk laws vary in their particulars 
(who can petition, standards of evidence, and length of deprivation), and 
the particulars have important constitutional implications—as Part II 
addresses in more detail—the basic model is similar to that of domestic 
violence restraining orders (“DVROs”), which are available in all fifty 
states.39 Although the substance and process varies from state to state, 
DVROs allow people victimized by domestic violence to petition a court 
for an order that, among other things, can prohibit the respondent from 
possessing a firearm.40 
Extreme risk laws have spread with striking speed. As of 2017, only 
five states had anything on the books that might be described as an 
extreme risk law.41 Connecticut adopted the first in 1999, following a 
 
37 See, e.g., Michael A. Norko & Madelon Baranoski, Gun Control Legislation in 
Connecticut: Effects on Persons with Mental Illness, 46 Conn. L. Rev. 1609, 1618 (2014) 
(reporting that under Connecticut’s extreme risk law, “the majority of gun owners who were 
served warrants had no history of psychiatric treatment”); Vars, supra note 8, at 1648–49 
(proposing a legal mechanism to disarm those actively experiencing delusions or 
hallucinations to stop individuals like Navy Yard shooter Aaron Alexis, who did not have a 
prior disqualifying mental health adjudication).  
38 See infra Section I.B. 
39 See generally A.B.A. Comm’n on Domestic & Sexual Violence, Domestic Violence Civil 
Protection Orders (CPOs) (Aug. 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/-
administrative/domestic_violence1/Charts/migrated_charts/2016%20CPO%20Availability%
20Chart.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3ED-VLXQ] (providing a basic overview of domestic 
violence civil protection orders in all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the territories).  
40 Id. (demonstrating how DVROs vary by state). The point here is only to suggest some 
general structural similarities; there are also important distinctions between the two. DVROs 
can only be sought by family members or those with similar types of relationships, for 
example, while ERPOs can also be sought by law enforcement. DVROs provide a wider range 
of protections, including no-contact provisions, while ERPOs respond to a wider range of 
risks, including self-harm. Educ. Fund to Stop Gun Violence, Extreme Risk Protection Orders 
vs. Domestic Violence Restraining Orders (July 2018), http://efsgv.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2018/07/ERPO-DVRO-Comparison-July-2018-FINAL-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EA 
3-BH8B]. 
41 Timothy Williams, What Are ‘Red Flag’ Gun Laws, and How Do They Work?, N.Y. 
Times (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/06/us/red-flag-laws.html 
[https://perma.cc/CH2J-PYSF].  
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workplace mass shooting at a state lottery facility.42 The Connecticut law 
allows law enforcement officers to temporarily remove firearms from a 
person if the police have probable cause to believe “that . . . a person 
poses a risk of imminent personal injury to himself or herself or to other 
individuals.”43 Indiana adopted a similar law in 2006, allowing police to 
temporarily seize guns from a “dangerous individual” pending a judicial 
hearing.44 State courts in Connecticut and Indiana have rejected 
constitutional challenges thus far.45 
The Indiana and Connecticut laws are different from the other extreme 
risk laws discussed here—and are often classified as “firearm removal” 
laws instead—because they provide only for removal of firearms from 
dangerous people who already have them. More recent extreme risk 
protection laws apply even to people who have not yet acquired (but 
might be seeking) a firearm. Despite that difference, the Connecticut and 
Indiana laws are generally regarded as having provided the model for the 
second wave of extreme risk laws.  
That wave began to swell in 2014, when California adopted an extreme 
risk law in the wake of a mass shooting in Santa Barbara.46 California’s 
law,47 like many that would follow it, differed from the Connecticut and 
Indiana laws in at least two key respects. First, it allows family 
members—not just law enforcement officers or state officials—to file 
petitions.48 Second, if those petitions are granted by judges, they typically 
result in not only the removal of existing firearms but also a prohibition 
 
42 Norko & Baranoski, supra note 37, at 1615.  
43 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-38c (2019).  
44 Ind. Code Ann. § 35-47-14-1–3, 5 (LexisNexis 2009).  
45 See infra notes 87–89 and accompanying text. 
46 Like many mass shooters, the perpetrator planned his shooting ahead of time, and those 
close to him noted warning signs. Joseph Serna, Elliot Rodger Meticulously Planned Isla Vista 
Rampage, Report Says, L.A. Times (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-
me-ln-santa-barbara-isla-vista-rampage-investigation-20150219-story.html [https://perma.cc/ 
23DQ-ZL6Y]. 
47 Cal. Penal Code §§ 18100, 18122 (Deering Supp. 2020).  
48 See Cal. Penal Code §§ 18150(a)(2), 18170(b) (Deering Supp. 2020). As of September 1, 
2020, the category of petitioners under the California law will expand further to include—
with some limitations—employers and teachers. See 2019 Cal. Stat. 6119 (repealing and 
replacing Cal. Pen. Code § 18150).  
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on purchasing them in the future.49 Washington followed suit in 2016,50 
as did Oregon in 2017.51  
Then came the mass murders at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High 
School in Parkland, Florida, on February 14, 2018, and the massive and 
ongoing political debate that followed. Increased adoption of extreme risk 
laws has been one of the most concrete legislative results of that debate.52 
As of August 2020, nineteen states and the District of Columbia had 
adopted some version of an extreme risk law.53 Polls suggest that the laws 
are quite popular,54 including with gun owners,55 and President Trump 
has expressed some support.56 Indeed, some gun rights advocates claim 
that “[w]hat makes red flag laws even more dangerous is the bipartisan 
support they currently boast.”57 Even the NRA expressed support for 
 
49 Cal. Penal Code § 18120(a) (Deering Supp. 2020). This difference is less significant since, 
in 2019, Indiana passed a further law to prohibit purchase of firearms by persons “found to be 
dangerous by a circuit or superior court having jurisdiction over the person following a hearing 
under” the state’s risk law. See Ind. Code Ann. § 35-47-4-6.5 (LexisNexis Supp. 2019).  
50 Wash. Rev. Code § 7.94.010 (2019).  
51 Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 166.525, 166.527 (West Supp. 2019).  
52 Adhiti Bandlamudi, The Complicated Politics of Passing a Red Flag Law, WUNC (Aug. 
9, 2019), https://gunsandamerica.org/story/19/08/09/the-complicated-politics-of-passing-a-
red-flag-law/ [https://perma.cc/YKK8-9TBV].  
53 Giffords L. Ctr. to Prevent Gun Violence, Extreme Risk Protection Orders, 
https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/who-can-have-a-gun/extreme-risk-
protection-orders/ [https://perma.cc/NG3Z-XNLQ] (last visited March 26, 2020) [hereinafter 
Giffords, ERPO]. 
54 Washington Post-ABC News Poll April 8–11, 2018, Wash. Post, 
https://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/politics/washington-post-abc-news-poll-april-8-11-
2018/2301 [https://perma.cc/E8ZJ-TLXA] (last visited Aug. 4, 2020); Emily Guskin & Scott 
Clement, Has Parkland Changed Americans’ Views on Guns?, Wash. Post (April 20, 2018, 
6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/04/20/has-parkland-
changed-americans-views-on-guns/ [https://perma.cc/JZ47-HQZR].  
55 Glob. Strategy Grp. & Everytown for Gun Safety, Voters Call for Background Checks, 
Strong Red Flag Bill (Sept. 6, 2019), https://everytown.org/documents/2019/09/global-
strategy-group-and-everytown-for-gun-safety.pdf/ [https://perma.cc/UP2D-Q6UM] (poll 
conducted on behalf of Everytown for Gun Safety, a gun violence prevention group, reporting 
that 85% of respondents favored federal extreme risk legislation, including 78% of gun 
owners). 
56 President Donald J. Trump Is Committed To Making Our Schools Safer, White House 
(Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-
committed-making-schools-safer/ [https://perma.cc/F7BY-PB4E].  
57 José Niño, Red Flag Laws: The Latest Anti-Gun Scheme, Mises Inst. (July 27, 2018) 
https://mises.org/power-market/red-flag-laws-latest-anti-gun-scheme [https://perma.cc/JKD3 
-3Z5L].  
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extreme risk laws in the immediate aftermath of Parkland,58 though some 
argue that the group has actually worked to undermine them, for example 
by demanding procedural requirements (like a prohibition on ex parte 
removals) that would make the laws either ineffective or impractical.59 
Despite this consistently positive trajectory of adoption, the degree to 
which extreme risk laws are enforced varies widely, both across states and 
across time. In the aggregate, it seems that extreme risk laws are being 
used with increasing frequency, albeit more in some states or counties 
than others.60 As with any law, differences in enforcement have serious 
implications for effectiveness,61 but we largely hold aside those 
implementation questions here, except to the degree that they bear on the 
constitutional calculus. 
At the federal level, extreme risk laws are becoming a major part of the 
gun regulation debate, but they have not yet resulted in any legislation. 
(This alone should not be surprising, since Congress has not passed 
significant gun regulation since the mid-1990s.) As noted above, federal 
law already limits the ability of certain classes of people to purchase and 
in some case possess firearms, but those limitations do not reach the same 
categories as extreme risk laws.62 For example, federal law does limit the 
 
58 Nicole Gaudiano, Under Pressure, NRA Voices Support for Gun Violence Restraining 
Orders, USA Today (Mar. 19, 2018, 3:25 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/-
news/politics/2018/03/19/under-pressure-nra-voices-support-gun-violence-restraining-orders 
/433716002/ [https://perma.cc/2SHE-WKZA]; NRA-ILA’s Chris W. Cox Releases Statement 
on School Safety Report, NRA-ILA (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.nraila.org/articles/ 
20181218/nra-ilas-chris-w-cox-releases-statement-on-school-safety-report [https://perma.cc/ 
W4PZ-FFMA]. 
59 Alex Yablon, First, the NRA Watered Down a Red Flag Bill. Then It Mobilized To Kill 
It., Trace (July 12, 2018), https://www.thetrace.org/2018/07/red-flag-laws-pennsylvania-nra-
stephens [https://perma.cc/Z7YC-YA53].  
60 Jonathan Levinson, 2 Years In, Oregon’s Red Flag Law Paints A Picture Of Crisis, OPB 
(Dec. 17, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.opb.org/news/article/oregon-red-flag-law-two-year-
firearms-protection-order/ [https://perma.cc/PGH8-E4MU] (noting variation within Oregon 
about ERPO petitions, with a third of counties seeing no petitions almost two years after 
adoption). 
61 Aaron J. Kivisto & Peter Lee Phalen, Effects of Risk-Based Firearm Seizure Laws in 
Connecticut and Indiana on Suicide Rates, 1981–2015, 69 Psychiatric Servs. 855, 855, 858 
(2018), https://ps.psychiatryonline.org/doi/10.1176/appi.ps.201700250 [https://perma.cc/-
L8Q4-6WFZ] (noting that increased enforcement of Connecticut’s firearms removal law was 
associated with a fourteen percent reduction in firearm suicides).  
62 Whether the subjects of these laws should be understood as lacking Second Amendment 
rights or simply be subject to governmental prohibition—whether their rights are “void” or 
“voidable”—is an interesting conceptual question. See Jacob D. Charles, Defeasible Second 
Amendment Rights: Conceptualizing Gun Laws that Dispossess Prohibited Persons, 83 Law 
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ability of those with mental illness to purchase or possess weapons, but 
only if such a person has been committed to a mental institution, 
adjudicated mentally ill, or found not guilty by reason of insanity.63 
Federal law also criminalizes the possession of guns by certain categories 
of people who present a particular risk to others, but again the 
classification tends to turn on the result of a category-based adjudication, 
like a conviction for a felony or crime of violence.64 
Since 2018, a few prominent bills regarding extreme risk laws have 
been introduced in Congress. One set of proposals would add people 
subject to extreme risk orders to the list of people already prohibited from 
possessing guns (felons, “mental defective[s],” and so on).65 Others 
would create a federal extreme risk law.66 Another and more prominent 
set of proposals would incentivize states to adopt their own extreme risk 
laws by providing federal support.67 Such proposals seem to have gained 
some traction with Democrats and some Republicans,68 though they vary 
greatly in their stringency with regard to which kinds of state laws they 
would reward and incentivize. For purposes of this Article, what matters 
 
& Contemp. Probs. 53, 53–54 (2020) (citing Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 451–52 (7th Cir. 
2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting)). 
63 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) (2012); see also 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2019) (defining 
“[a]djudicated as a mental defective” and “[c]ommitted to a mental institution”).  
64 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012). To be clear, not all of the federal prohibitions require a 
conviction, but the procedural protections are significant. Section 922(g)(8), for example, 
applies to restrain a “person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner . . . or 
child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an 
intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child.” Id. § 922(g)(8)(B). 
Such an order can only be entered following a hearing in which the respondent had actual 
notice and a chance to participate, and must be predicated on a finding that “[1] represents a 
credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or . . . [2] by its terms 
explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against” the 
protected persons. Id. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i)–(ii). 
65 See, e.g., Extreme Risk Protection Order Act of 2019, S. 506, 116th Cong. (2019); 
Michael A. Foster, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IF11205, Firearm “Red Flag” Laws in the 116th 
Congress (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF11205.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5KW-Y9SA]. 
66 Federal Extreme Risk Protection Order Act of 2018, S. 2521, 115th Cong. (2018). 
67 See, e.g., Victor Garcia, Senator Graham Pushes Back on Critics of ‘Red Flag’ 
Legislation: ‘The Second Amendment Is Not a Suicide Pact,’ Fox News (Aug. 12, 2019), 
https://www.foxnews.com/media/senator-graham-pushes-back-on-critics-of-red-flag-
legislation-the-second-amendment-is-not-a-suicide-pact [https://perma.cc/4CNA-KKTM]; 
Alex Leary, Rubio, Nelson Pitch Idea To Encourage States To Adopt ‘Gun Violence 
Restraining Orders,’ Tampa Bay Times (Mar. 7, 2018), http://www.tampabay.com/florida-
politics/buzz/2018/03/07/rubio-nelson-pitch-idea-to-encourage-states-to-adopt-gun-violence-
restraining-orders/ [https://perma.cc/A42B-8PG4].  
68 Leary, supra note 67.  
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most is that the conditions themselves tend to track the due process 
concerns discussed in more detail below: standards of proof, time limits, 
and the like.69 
Because extreme risk laws are a relatively new phenomenon, empirical 
research about their effectiveness is not complete. Still, the early returns 
are promising. Although it is impossible to identify with certainty a single 
reason why shootings (including both suicides and homicides) do not 
happen, it is easy to imagine how extreme risk laws could contribute to 
safety. For one thing, they are crafted so as to apply only to people who 
have exhibited warning signs of harmful behavior. Studies indicate that 
those signs are present in many cases of both suicide70 and homicide, 
including mass shootings.71 Perhaps most importantly, the majority of 
suicides in the United States are effectuated with firearms.72 Given that 
the availability of a gun is a strong predictor of whether suicidal ideation 
will result in death by suicide73—roughly ninety percent of suicide 
attempts involving firearms result in death,74 whereas most people who 
survive their first attempt will not ultimately die by suicide75—it stands 
to reason that removing firearms from a person in a suicidal crisis will 
lower their risk of death.  
 
69 Foster, supra note 65 (“Though varying in the details, several bills . . . would establish 
grant programs to aid in implementation of red flag laws, conditioning the receipt of such 
grants . . . on adoption of laws that meet certain requirements (e.g., standards of proof for 
extreme risk protection orders and time limits on such orders).”). 
70 See, e.g., Matthew K. Nock et al., Suicide and Suicidal Behavior, 30 Epidemiologic Revs. 
133, 144–45 (2008). 
71 James Silver, Andre Simons & Sarah Craun, U.S. Dep’t of Just., FBI, A Study of the Pre-
Attack Behaviors of Active Shooters in the United States Between 2000 and 2013, at 18 (June 
2018), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/pre-attack-behaviors-of-active-shooters-in-us-
2000-2013.pdf/view [https://perma.cc/6BFK-H92Z] (reporting patterns of concerning 
behaviors by shooters prior to attacks); U.S. Secret Serv. Nat’l Threat Assessment Ctr., Mass 
Attacks in Public Spaces—2018, at 12 (July 2019), http://www.secretservice.gov/data/ 
press/reports/USSS_FY2019_MAPS.pdf [https://perma.cc/4R4Z-GG7Z]. 
72 Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Implementation and Effectiveness of Connecticut’s Risk-
Based Gun Removal Law: Does It Prevent Suicides?, 80 Law & Contemp. Probs. 179, 183 
(2017). 
73 Andrew Anglemyer, Tara Horvath & George Rutherford, The Accessibility of Firearms 
and Risk for Suicide and Homicide Victimization Among Household Members: A Systematic 
Review and Meta-Analysis, 160 Annals Internal Med. 101, 105 (2014).  
74 Matthew Miller, Deborah Azrael & Catherine Barber, Suicide Mortality in the United 
States: The Importance of Attending to Method in Understanding Population-Level 
Disparities in the Burden of Suicide, 33 Ann. Rev. Pub. Health 393, 397 (2012). 
75 See David Owens, Judith Horrocks & Allan House, Fatal and Non-Fatal Repetition of 
Self-Harm: Systematic Review, 181 Brit. J. Psychiatry 193, 193–99 (2002). 
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Given the recency of extreme risk laws’ adoption, research and 
evidence about their effectiveness remains more limited than, for 
example, the robust literature regarding public carrying of arms.76 But 
some studies have already reported encouraging results, especially with 
regard to the prevention of suicides. In perhaps the most prominent study, 
scholars analyzed the effectiveness of Connecticut’s “risk warrant” law 
between October 1999 and June 2013. The authors concluded that one 
suicide was averted for every ten or eleven guns seized.77 
Two years after the Connecticut study, another study analyzed the 
Connecticut and Indiana laws (being the oldest extreme risk laws, they 
are the most natural candidates for empirical analysis; other laws might 
eventually be subject to the same scrutiny), and found that Indiana’s 
firearm seizure law “was associated with a 7.5% reduction in firearm 
suicides in the ten years following its enactment,” while “[e]nactment of 
Connecticut’s law was associated with a 1.6% reduction in firearm 
suicides immediately after its passage and a 13.7% reduction in firearm 
suicides in the post-Virginia Tech period, when enforcement of the law 
substantially increased.”78 
A third study focused on the link between extreme risk orders and mass 
shootings, detailing twenty-one California cases in which orders were 
issued, including some involving threatened workplace shootings.79 In 
none of those cases did any shooting occur, suggesting perhaps the ways 
in which extreme risk orders can be used to prevent not only suicides but 
 
76 Compare John R. Lott, Jr., More Guns, Less Crime: Understanding Crime and Gun-
Control Laws (1998) (arguing that greater firearm ownership leads to reductions in crime), 
with Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime” 
Hypothesis, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1193, 1201 (2003) (critiquing Lott’s hypothesis directly); see 
also Abhay Aneja, John J. Donohue III & Alexandria Zhang, The Impact of Right To Carry 
Laws and the NRC Report: The Latest Lessons for the Empirical Evaluation of Law and Policy 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 18294, 2012) (examining the results of right 
to carry laws). 
77 Swanson et al., supra note 72, at 203. 
78 Kivisto & Phalen, supra note 61, at 855.  
79 Garen J. Wintemute et al., Extreme Risk Protection Orders Intended to Prevent Mass 
Shootings: A Case Series, 171 Annals Internal Med. 655, 655–56 (2019), 
https://annals.org/aim/fullarticle/2748711/extreme-risk-protection-orders-intended-prevent-
mass-shootings-case-series [https://perma.cc/AJB4-6PDK]. 
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also mass homicides.80 Not all commentators are convinced, however,81 
and the effectiveness of the laws will surely continue to depend on how 
often they are enforced—some face “significant barriers” as a matter of 
policing.82 Undoubtedly, as with the empirical debates about publicly 
carrying,83 the scholarly conversation is just beginning. 
The importance and even relevance of that debate is intertwined with 
the constitutional objections to extreme risk laws. While a showing of 
effectiveness might help the laws survive constitutional challenge (for 
example by demonstrating appropriate “tailoring” for purposes of 
heightened scrutiny), their utility as a policy matter is not enough to 
resolve constitutional challenges emanating from the Second Amendment 
and Due Process Clause.  
Unsurprisingly, extreme risk laws are opposed by some gun rights 
advocates on the basis that they would violate the Second Amendment. 
Indeed, in some places this opposition has helped spark the adoption of 
“Second Amendment sanctuary” resolutions by which local governments 
pledge opposition to gun regulations like extreme risk laws and 
background checks.84 As a matter of doctrine, however, Second 
Amendment challenges to extreme risk laws have not fared well. There 
have been few such challenges, and they have been unsuccessful.85 
Admittedly, however, there is a lack of in-depth case law on the issue.  
 
80 Id. at 656 (“Orders after hearings were issued in 14 of 15 cases in which they were 
requested. No mass shootings, other homicides, or suicides by persons subject to GVROs were 
identified.”).  
81 John R. Lott, Jr., & Carlisle E. Moody, Do Red Flag Laws Save Lives or Reduce Crime? 
3–4 (Dec. 28, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=3316573 [https://perma.cc/7M3X-6NLX]. 
82 Swanson et al., supra note 72, at 196 (noting, in the Connecticut context, that “mismatch 
between available police staffing resources in most departments and the statutory requirement 
that two officers appear as co-affiants before a judge to obtain the risk warrant” and “the 
problem of gun storage”); id. at 189 (noting that “very few gun removals were carried out 
during the first eight years after the [Connecticut] law went into effect—about twenty per year, 
on average, from 1999 through 2006,” but that the number increased “about fivefold—to about 
100 cases per year” after the Virginia Tech mass shooting in 2007). 
83 Supra note 76 and sources cited therein.  
84 Nick Penzenstadler, NRA Helps Sheriffs Fight Gun Laws in Second Amendment 
‘Sanctuaries,’ USA Today (May 20, 2019, 3:14 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/investigations/2019/05/20/new-gun-laws-spark-secret-messaging-recalls/37446 
76002/ [https://perma.cc/L6U4-8B54]. 
85 In general, Second Amendment claims have not fared well. See generally Eric Ruben & 
Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the Right To Keep and 
Bear Arms After Heller, 67 Duke L.J. 1433, 1472 (2018) (noting, based on review of more 
than 1,100 Second Amendment challenges, a success rate of roughly 9%). 
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In Hope v. State,86 a Connecticut appellate court considered a Second 
Amendment challenge to the Connecticut firearm removal law described 
above. The court rejected the challenge: 
[The law] does not implicate the [S]econd [A]mendment, as it does not 
restrict the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in 
defense of their homes. It restricts for up to one year the rights of only 
those whom a court has adjudged to pose a risk of imminent physical 
harm to themselves or others after affording due process protection to 
challenge the seizure of the firearms. The statute is an example of the 
longstanding “presumptively lawful regulatory measures” articulated in 
District of Columbia v. Heller.87 
Similarly, in Redington v. State, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that 
Indiana’s firearms removal law did not violate the state constitutional 
right to keep and bear arms, because it applied only to those shown, by 
clear and convincing evidence, to “present a risk of personal injury to 
either themselves or other individuals.”88 As a result, it did not “place a 
material burden” on the “core” right of law-abiding citizens to bear arms 
in self-defense.89 
Although this Article is not focused on Second Amendment challenges, 
it is worth noting that regulating the risk of firearm misuse at the 
individual level is not a wholly new phenomenon. The practice of 
imposing peace bonds on those who threatened harm was well-
established at common law, including in England centuries before the 
American Revolution.90 Indeed, although such laws have largely fallen 
 
86 133 A.3d 519 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).  
87 Id. at 524–25. 
88 992 N.E.2d 823, 834–35 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 
89 Id. at 835.  
90 See 5 William Blackstone, Commentaries *251 (“[P]reventive justice consists in obliging 
those persons, whom there is a probable ground to suspect of future misbehaviour, to stipulate 
with and to give full assurance to the public, that such offence as is apprehended shall not 
happen; by finding pledges and securities for keeping the peace, or for their good behaviour.”); 
Joel B. Samaha, The Recognizance in Elizabethan Law Enforcement, 25 Am. J. Legal Hist. 
189, 195 (1981) (describing the peace bond process and explaining that, to initiate the process, 
“[t]he person in fear of harm appeared before a Justice of the Peace and swore under oath that 
he was in danger of life or limb and therefore, that he ought to have surety of the peace by the 
person who created the danger”); see also Sidney Childress, Peace Bonds—Ancient 
Anachronisms or Viable Crime Prevention Devices?, 21 Am. J. Crim. L. 407, 416–21 (1994) 
(describing the origin and history of peace bonds). 
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into desuetude, versions of them still exist in many states today.91 These 
types of laws could be used against those who pose a particular threat with 
firearms.92  
Extreme risk laws also potentially raise Fourth Amendment concerns.93 
For example, a warrant to search for or seize firearms issued with an 
ERPO implicates the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that such 
warrants issue only upon probable cause.94 New Jersey’s extreme risk law 
is currently being challenged on Fourth Amendment grounds because it 
 
91 12 Am. Jur. 2d Breach of Peace & Disorderly Conduct § 38 (2019) (footnotes omitted) 
(“Statutory enactments in most jurisdictions reflect the common-law principle that as a matter 
of preventive justice a person may under certain circumstances be ordered by a court to give 
security against future breach of the peace by him or her, and that he or she may be imprisoned 
for not complying with such an order. Peace bond statutes serve a salutary purpose and are an 
effective and proper deterrent to violence, either actually perpetrated or immediately 
threatened.”); see also Commonwealth v. Miller, 305 A.2d 346, 348 (Pa. 1973) (stating that 
Pennsylvania’s Surety of the Peace Act “provides preventive justice and requires persons of 
whom there is probable cause to suspect future violent behavior to give full assurance to the 
public against the anticipated offenses”); id. at 350 (Nix, J., concurring) (describing the Act 
as fulfilling “the need in our law of a provision that will enable a court to take prompt and 
effective action to deter a threatened or imminent wrong”). Pennsylvania repealed the law at 
issue in Miller in 1978. Act of Apr. 28, 1978, Pub. L. No. 1978-53, 1978 Pa. Laws 202, 232. 
92 Saul Cornell, The Right To Keep and Carry Arms in Anglo-American Law: Preserving 
Liberty and Keeping the Peace, 80 Law & Contemp. Probs. 11, 24 (2017) (“Rather than 
encourage individuals to arm themselves in response to such threats [of armed violence], 
English law required individuals to seek out a magistrate, justice of the peace, or constable 
and have the aggressor disarmed and placed under a peace bond.”); C. Kevin Marshall, Why 
Can’t Martha Stewart Have A Gun?, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 695, 717 (2009) (noting, in 
the context of historical firearm prohibitions, that “[o]ne means of conserving the peace, apart 
from prosecuting those who breached it, was to order persons who posed particular risks to 
provide sureties of the peace”). 
93 Michael Hammond, Kafkaesque ‘Red Flag Laws’ Strip Gun Owners of Their 
Constitutional Rights, USA Today (Apr. 19, 2018, 2:30 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/-
story/opinion/2018/04/19/red-flag-laws-strip-gun-rights-violate-constitution-column/52622-
1002/ [https://perma.cc/ZR4E-LRGZ] (“At their core, [extreme risk laws] allow the police to 
convene a Kafkaesque secret proceeding, in which an American can be stripped of his or her 
gun rights and Fourth Amendment rights, even though gun owners are barred from 
participating in the hearings or arguing their side of the dispute.”). 
94 State v. Hemenway, 216 A.3d 118, 121, 128, 134 (N.J. 2019) (holding that New Jersey’s 
domestic violence restraining order law, which permitted issuance of a warrant to search for 
firearms upon a showing only of “good cause,” violated the Fourth Amendment). In response 
to this ruling, New Jersey’s Attorney General issued a directive to law enforcement and 
prosecutors tasked with enforcing the state’s extreme risk law—which uses the same standard 
as in the domestic violence law—to “establish and request that the search warrant associated 
with an ERPO application be issued by the court under the standard of probable cause.” See 
Gurbir S. Grewal, Att’y Gen., Att’y Gen. Law Enf’t Directive No. 2019-2, at 5 (Aug. 15, 
2019). 
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authorizes issuance of a search warrant upon a showing of “good cause.”95 
And beyond the specific ERPO challenges, the presence of firearms raises 
a host of Fourth Amendment issues that are beyond the scope of this 
Article.96  
These constitutional issues are important and consequential, but in our 
view, the more serious challenges to extreme risk laws are those involving 
due process.97 Answering those challenges requires a more detailed 
understanding of how the laws work and what the Constitution requires. 
This Part explores the former; Part II will address the latter.  
B. A New Paradigm for Gun Regulation? 
Extreme risk laws are novel not only in terms of the recency of their 
adoption but also in the way that they frame the issue of gun regulation. 
Person-based firearm restrictions have traditionally been conceptualized 
and justified as a means of denying guns to classes of persons thought to 
pose a particular risk to themselves or to others. Extreme risk laws, 
because they are triggered by individualized determinations about risk, 
represent an effort to regulate at the retail, rather than wholesale, level—
focusing on particularized situations rather than broad groups. Moreover, 
extreme risk laws bring to the foreground an implicit but foundational 
division between thinking about gun regulation as punishment—a frame 
captured by the emphasis on “law-abiding citizens”98—and thinking 
about gun regulation as risk management. 
 
95 Michael Hill, New Jersey’s Red Flag Law Gets Challenged in Federal Court, NJ Spotlight 
(Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.njspotlight.com/2019/11/new-jerseys-red-flag-law-gets-
challenged-in-federal-court/ [https://perma.cc/7K35-4DKV] (describing the Fourth 
Amendment challenge). 
96 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916, 947 (Pa. 2019), cert. denied sub nom. 
Pennsylvania v. Hicks, 140 S. Ct. 645 (2019) (holding that mere possession of a concealed 
firearm in public does not suffice to justify a Terry stop); Bellin, supra note 20, at 5 (“As gun 
carrying becomes both lawful and common, even in major cities, police lose the ability to 
invoke public gun possession as a Fourth-Amendment-satisfying basis for investigation.”).  
97 Even advocacy organizations have emphasized the importance of incorporating due 
process protections. See, e.g., Educ. Fund to Stop Gun Violence et al., Extreme Risk Laws: A 
Toolkit for Developing Life-Saving Policy in Your State 14 (n.d.), https://live-giffords-
org.pantheonsite.io/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Extreme-Risk-Laws-Toolkit.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/57T3-292F] (arguing that laws should be “reflective of a state’s existing 
processes for protective orders with due process protections” and should include an 
“[o]pportunity for respondent[s] to petition for early termination”). 
98 See infra Subsection I.B.2. 
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Both of these characteristics have important implications for the due 
process analysis below, but they are also important to consider on their 
own terms. To the degree that extreme risk laws present a new paradigm 
of gun regulation—one focused on individualized determinations rather 
than proxies, and risk rather than punishment—they may offer a new way 
forward in an often-stalled gun debate. 
1. Retail Gun Regulation 
State and federal laws prohibit certain classes of persons from buying 
or possessing arms. Federal law covers felons, those adjudicated mentally 
ill, fugitives from justice, habitual users of illegal drugs, and others.99 
Such laws have been overwhelmingly upheld against constitutional 
challenges.100 The felon prohibitor, in particular, has been the subject of 
hundreds of post-Heller Second Amendment challenges (nearly a quarter 
of all such challenges), roughly ninety-nine percent of which have 
failed.101 Although this is not the place to interrogate the constitutionality 
of any particular class-based prohibition in detail, the legal battles over 
those prohibitions can help shed light on what is so novel and interesting 
about extreme risk laws.  
Class-based prohibitions have been evaluated and justified through a 
variety of different lenses. Some believe that such prohibitions are 
constitutional based on their historical lineage,102 or the notion that the 
prohibited persons (felons, at least) are “unvirtuous.”103 But perhaps the 
most straightforward and intuitive way to understand them is as 
representing a determination about risk of harm—the categories of 
persons prohibited by law from owning arms are those who likely pose a 
heightened danger to themselves or others. On this view, the 
classifications are proxies for what really matters: risk.  
But, of course, proxies are only that. Many people with felony 
convictions—and certainly most people with mental illness—will 
probably never harm another person, and might not even present much of 
 
99 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012) (making it unlawful for felons, fugitives, drug 
addicts, and the mentally ill to possess a firearm). 
100 See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 85, at 1481 (noting a four percent success rate of 
Second Amendment challenges to laws prohibiting arms possession by particular classes of 
people).  
101 Id. 
102 See, e.g., United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 600 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he longstanding 
limitations mentioned by the Court in Heller are exceptions to the right to bear arms.”). 
103 See supra note 34 and sources cited therein. 
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a heightened risk of doing so. As the title of an oft-cited law review article 
puts it: “Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?”104 Of course, the fact 
that a proxy is imperfect does not mean it is impermissible—it is the very 
nature of a rule to be overbroad and underinclusive, after all,105 and nearly 
every legal prohibition reaches conduct that might not be directly harmful 
in any particular instance. Most speeding drivers don’t hurt anyone, but 
that doesn’t make speed limits irrational. 
When such overbreadth impinges on constitutional interests, including 
the right to keep and bear arms, law has ways to relieve the pressure. One 
is through specified mechanisms for restoration of gun rights.106 As a 
matter of constitutional law, however, the push for tailoring manifests in 
as-applied challenges—those seeking to carve out a particular individual 
from a class-based prohibition. A felon with a distant, non-violent 
conviction, for example,107 or a person with a single mental health episode 
long ago,108 might argue that a class-based prohibition is unconstitutional 
as applied in his or her particular case. 
The connection to extreme risk laws is clear; the notion is that legal 
burdens should be properly tailored to the individual. ERPOs, too, rely on 
individualized determinations, albeit in the opposite direction. While as-
applied challenges carve people out of legal prohibitions, extreme risk 
laws temporarily impose them, but for the same reason—a mismatch 
between the reasons for existing legal prohibitions (lessening risk) and 
their application in a particular case. When a class-based proxy is 
particularly inappropriate (like for the dangerousness of a non-violent 
felon with an old conviction), perhaps it should be disregarded. 
Conversely, when class-based proxies fail to reach those that they 
should—a dangerous person without a disqualifying felony, for 
 
104 Marshall, supra note 92. 
105 Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 
1685, 1695 (1976) (“The use of rules, as opposed to standards, to deter immoral or antisocial 
conduct means that sometimes perfectly innocent behavior will be punished, and that 
sometimes plainly guilty behavior will escape sanction.”). 
106 See David T. Hardy, Losing and Regaining Firearm Rights: A Guide for the Legal 
Practitioner, 16 T.M. Cooley J. Prac. & Clinical L. 133 (2014); Michael Luo, Felons  
Finding It Easy To Regain Gun Rights, N.Y. Times (Nov. 13, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/14/us/felons-finding-it-easy-to-regain-gun-rights.html 
[https://perma.cc/RMD2-YMX6].  
107 Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 343, 356 (3d Cir. 2016).  
108 Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 681 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
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example—extreme risk laws provide a solution.109 The two phenomena 
are therefore interlocking and interrelated ways of policing and managing 
the line between prohibited and non-prohibited persons. 
Since this policing machinery is put into motion by an extreme risk 
petition, one important design choice is who gets to file such petitions in 
the first place. As a matter of legal design, the considerations at this stage 
are in some sense straightforward. Granting a petition (i.e., issuing an 
extreme risk order) depends on obtaining accurate and timely information 
about truly risky behaviors. That might push in favor of a large class of 
potential petitioners, so as to maximize information. But because the 
consequences of an order are serious (deprivation of a firearm, even for a 
temporary period), there are countervailing reasons to limit the class of 
petitioners, so as to lower the risk of false positives and harassment. In 
order for an extreme risk law to be effective, then, the category of 
available petitioners should include people with the best information 
about risks and incentives to accurately report it.  
Perhaps the most obvious category of potential petitioners are law 
enforcement officers, whose very job involves identifying and responding 
to risks. It is far beyond the scope of this Article to fully account for the 
ways in which law enforcement can or should respond to firearm threats, 
but it is worth noting that the mere presence of a gun—even in places that 
statutorily guarantee the right to carry one publicly without a license—
can generally support a stop-and-frisk.110 Extreme risk laws extend that 
power one step further (by forbidding the person from having a gun in the 
first place), but they also involve a further procedural step: a judge must 
approve the order, which of course is not required for a frisk. The 
consequences and process are both elevated.  
In practice, there does not seem to be much disagreement about 
whether extreme risk laws should permit petitions from law enforcement 
 
109 The individualized nature of ERPO proceedings makes it hard to credit the critique that 
they are based on “groupings.” See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, A Yellow Light for Red-Flag 
Laws, Wall St. J. (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-yellow-light-for-red-flag-
laws-11565132144?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=5 [https://perma.cc/CV9S-VJWA] 
(“Research shows that any group of people identified as future violent criminals will contain 
many more who won’t be violent (false positives) than who will (true positives). More true 
positives mean more false ones. Such groupings also fail to identify many future violent 
criminals (false negatives).”). That is an argument against the usual class-based prohibitors, 
not against ERPOs—if anything, it is a strong argument for them. 
110 See United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 711–12 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Harris, 
J., dissenting). But the Supreme Court has nonetheless declined to make a blanket “firearm 
exception” to the requirements for a stop and frisk. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000).  
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officers—every existing law does so.111 In a handful of states with 
particularly strict laws, only law enforcement officers can file petitions.112 
It is worth noting that special procedural concerns can potentially arise in 
these proceedings. The subjects of petitions might well be unrepresented 
(since the proceedings are civil, the State need not, as a constitutional 
matter, provide counsel), and could potentially misunderstand the 
procedures and consequences of an ERPO (including potential criminal 
sanctions for non-compliance). Where such problems are present—and 
we are unaware of any studies on point—due process rights might very 
well be implicated. 
A second category of possible petitioners—permitted in fourteen states 
and the District of Columbia—is immediate family members and others 
sharing a household with the subject of the order.113 As compared to law 
enforcement officers, family or household members generally have 
informational advantages, since they are presumably well-positioned to 
observe warning signs such as suicidal ideation, threats to others, and the 
like—behaviors that might not yet have resulted in any kind of formal 
legal intervention or determination, but could be predictive of future 
harm. As a matter of incentives, it also seems reasonable to begin with an 
assumption—though of course it will not always be the case—that family 
members genuinely care for the health and well-being of other family 
members and will only report seriously risky behaviors. Indeed, the law 
in various ways does tend to presume a relationship of trust and mutual 
obligation within a family.114 And an ERPO is a much less intrusive 
option than other possibilities like civil commitment or arrest. 
At the same time, those same family members might have strong 
incentives to underreport risk, for fear of the consequences to the gun 
 
111 Giffords, ERPO, supra note 53. 
112 See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 790.401 (2019); 8 R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 8-8.3-1, 8-8.3-3 (Supp. 2019); 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 4053 (2018); see also Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-38c (2019) (providing that 
a complaint may be filed by two law enforcement officers or one state’s attorney or assistant 
state’s attorney). 
113 Shannon Frattaroli et al., Assessment of Physician Self-Reported Knowledge and Use of 
Maryland’s Extreme Risk Protection Order Law, JAMA Network Open, Dec. 20, 2019, at 1, 
1 (“Such laws allow specified groups (law enforcement in all states, and family in 14 states 
and the District of Columbia) to petition a court when an individual is behaving 
dangerously . . . .”).  
114 Cf. Jacqueline J. Glover, Should Families Make Health Care Decisions?, 53 Md. L. Rev. 
1158, 1162 (1994) (noting, in the course of arguing in favor of “family decision” laws in the 
health care context, that “[t]here is a rich tradition that is supported in current law and policy 
that families are primary care providers and have widereaching obligations to do so”). 
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owner115 or to themselves. This can lead to serious complications for 
enforcement. In Coral Gables Police Department v. Tamayo, for 
example, a woman reported to the police that her husband was a serious 
threat.116 The police petitioned for an ERPO, but on the witness stand she 
denied that she had claimed him to be a threat. After the hearing, she said 
she recanted because she was afraid of the consequences, according to the 
law enforcement officers present, but the court nonetheless denied the 
order.117 The police department filed an appeal challenging the denial, but 
the court of appeals affirmed.118 
In certain toxic family environments—those involving serious distrust 
or abuse, for example—it is possible that false claims might be filed in an 
effort to harass or even disarm those who do not present any legitimate 
threat. Opponents of gun laws frequently raise this concern,119 though it 
is hard to say empirically whether and how it has played out in practice. 
Some extreme risk laws attempt to address it by specifically including 
civil or criminal penalties for those who knowingly file petitions based on 
false information.120 And, as noted below,121 the risk of false positives 
seems far outweighed by the risk of false negatives.  
The expansion of petitioner categories beyond immediate family and 
household members is controversial. Some states permit mental health 
providers,122 school administrators,123 medical professionals, co-workers, 
and educators124 to petition for an extreme risk order. As with law 
 
115 See, e.g., Nicole Darrah, Florida Mom Insists Her Son Who Allegedly Threatened  
Mass Shooting Is ‘Just a Little Kid’ Making Jokes, Fox News (Aug. 21, 2019), 
https://www.foxnews.com/us/florida-mom-son-mass-shooting-just-a-little-kid 
[https://perma.cc/E9TL-7WJJ]. 
116 Initial Brief of Coral Gables Police Department at 5–9, Coral Gables Police Dep’t v. 
Tamayo, 283 So. 3d 404 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (per curiam) (No. 18-2275) (describing 
claims made to police). 
117 Id. at 12–17 (describing hearing testimony and post-hearing statements).  
118 Tamayo, 283 So. 3d 404. 
119 See, e.g., Allison Graves, Did Florida Police Seize a Man’s Gun Without Due Process? 
No, PolitiFact (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.politifact.com/florida/statements/2018/apr/04/free-
thought-project/did-florida-police-seize-mans-gun-out-due-process-/ [https://perma.cc/6QX6 
-UEC3]; Hammond, supra note 93; Niño, supra note 57. 
120 See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 18200 (Deering Supp. 2020); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, 
§ 131V (2018); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 166.543(3) (West 2019); Wash. Rev. Code § 7.94.120(1) 
(2019). 
121 See infra text accompanying note 137. 
122 See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-601(E)(2) (LexisNexis 2019).  
123 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6340 (Consol. Supp. 2020). New York seems to be unique in this 
regard.  
124 See, e.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 134-61 (LexisNexis 2019).  
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enforcement and family members, these are categories of people who 
might be in a position to observe and respond to risks, including those that 
might presage a mass shooting in a school or workplace. But the broader 
the category of petitioners, the stronger the concerns about 
misidentification and abuse. When the California legislature attempted to 
amend its law to allow high school and college employees and co-workers 
to file petitions, then-Governor Jerry Brown vetoed the measure,125 
though Governor Gavin Newsom later signed the expansion into law.126 
Who actually petitions is an important but separate question from who 
has a right to do so. In California, at least as of 2017, petitions seem to 
come mostly from law enforcement officers. Of the nearly two hundred 
gun violence restraining orders issued, only a dozen were initiated by 
petitions from family members.127 In Maryland, by contrast, more than 
half of the more than three hundred gun removal petitions filed in the first 
three months of the law’s passage were filed by family members.128 It 
seems plausible that, as the general public becomes more aware of 
extreme risk laws—which, again, are a very new development—their use 
by family members (where permitted) will increase. 
The question of who can petition for an extreme risk order also 
intersects in interesting ways with broader currents of theory, politics, and 
doctrine surrounding the right to keep and bear arms. Some accounts of 
the right are heavily suffused with what might be called—to borrow from 
First Amendment theory129—a pathological perspective, in the sense that 
many gun owners feel that the right should be calibrated to protect against 
 
125 Melody Gutierrez, Jerry Brown Vetoes California Bill To Expand Gun Restraining 
Orders, S.F. Chron. (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/Jerry-
Brown-vetoes-California-bill-to-expand-gun-13261282.php [https://perma.cc/7PTK-74BZ].  
126 Don Thompson, California Adopts Broadest US Rules for Seizing Guns,  
Associated Press (Oct. 11, 2019), https://apnews.com/3ca4e1f867f2490c98b042358f8bf3b3 
[https://perma.cc/L2PZ-TRJA].  
127 Melody Gutierrez, California Starts Slowly on Seizing Unstable People’s Guns, but That 
Could Change, S.F. Chron. (May 11, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/ar 
ticle/California-starts-slow-on-seizing-unstable-12906043.php [https://perma.cc/6Y3K-MN 
NX].  
128 Ovetta Wiggins, Red-Flag Law in Maryland Led to Gun Seizures from 148 People in 
First Three Months, Wash. Post (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-
politics/red-flag-law-in-maryland-led-to-148-gun-seizures-in-first-three-months/2019/01/1 
5/cfb3676c-1904-11e9-9ebf-c5fed1b7a081_story.html [https://perma.cc/XU8L-LS6Z]. 
129 See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 Colum. 
L. Rev. 449, 449–50 (1985). 
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the worst possible eventuality: tyranny and oppression.130 From this 
perspective, the right to keep and bear arms is truly, as the title of the 
NRA’s official journal claims, “the ‘1st Freedom,’”131 and the one “the 
others lean on the most,” as NRA Vice President Wayne LaPierre has put 
it.132 For those holding such a view, any governmental efforts to regulate 
guns are likely to trigger a sense of persecution and fear, feeding the kind 
of apocalyptic rhetoric that is all too familiar in the gun debate.133 
Standard efforts to regulate guns through legislation tend to raise the 
specter of disarming law-abiding citizens, rather than focusing on those 
who present a risk to others. Extreme risk laws seem responsive to that 
concern, since they apply only to particular individuals and depend on a 
specific petition reviewed by a judge. 
And yet extreme risk laws also add a new wrinkle, at least for some, 
because the object of fear is not necessarily the government, but “[a]nti-
gun family members, friends, or acquaintances [who] can levy dubious 
accusations to justify the confiscation of law-abiding gun owners’ 
guns,”134 notwithstanding the aforementioned penalties for misuse. A 
leader of one gun rights organization has claimed that “the target is 
frequently an abused victim who is most in need of the wherewithal to 
protect against an abuser.”135 The tyrannical figure here is no longer a 
faceless bureaucrat, member of the beltway elite, or anti-gun judge, but 
one’s own friends and family.136 Of course, those people are also among 
the ones most at risk. 
 
130 See Darrell A.H. Miller, Retail Rebellion and the Second Amendment, 86 Ind. L.J. 939 
(2011) (providing examples and analyzing whether and how such a view could be manifested 
in doctrinal rules). 
131 America’s 1st Freedom, https://www.americas1stfreedom.org/ [https://perma.cc/2EG8-
G3DW] (last visited July 11, 2020).  
132 Wayne LaPierre, Guns, Freedom, and Terrorism 29 (2003).  
133 See, e.g., Blocher, supra note 17, at 826–27 (providing examples of this rhetoric). 
134 Niño, supra note 57.  
135 Hammond, supra note 93. We are not aware of any evidence to support this claim. There 
is, however, evidence to suggest that victims of abuse are at even higher risk when firearms 
are accessible. Aaron J. Kivisto, et al., Firearm Ownership and Domestic Versus Nondomestic 
Homicide in the U.S., 57 Am. J. Preventative Med. 311, 312 (2019) (concluding that the 
presence of a gun makes it five times more likely that a woman will be killed by an abusive 
partner).  
136 Some accounts of the anti-tyranny theory of the Second Amendment describe private 
violence and oppression as a form of tyranny. See, e.g., Nicholas J. Johnson et al., Firearms 
Law and the Second Amendment: Regulation, Rights, and Policy 1256–57 (2d ed. 2018) 
(arguing that “[a]lthough ‘tyranny’ is typically thought of as being perpetrated by governments 
against their people, this is, arguably, not the only context in which the unrestrained abuse of 
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Although some critics allege that such orders are frequently abused, it 
is difficult to find concrete evidence supporting this claim, and the legal 
processes and personal incentives already provide substantial protection 
against false reporting. Given the incentives, it seems likely that there will 
be far more false negatives (guns not removed from a situation of extreme 
risk) than false positives (guns wrongly removed thanks to false or 
misleading testimony). Even people with valid claims may be 
substantially deterred by the prospect of going to court to convince a 
judge that a family member is engaged in risky behavior. If the situation 
in a gun-owning household has deteriorated to the point that one family 
member is prepared to falsely accuse another of having engaged in risky 
behaviors (rather than, for example, simply throwing the guns away or 
hiding them), then it seems all the more likely that the risk of gun violence 
is especially heightened. And even then, many ERPO laws already 
provide for legal sanction in cases of false reporting,137 to say nothing of 
other potential tort liability. In short, if the question is which risk—false 
accusations or gun violence—presents the greater prospect of harm, the 
answer seems clear.  
In any event, these are largely questions of policy and politics, and our 
focus here is on constitutionality. On that front, the tradeoff between 
preventing harms of firearm misuse and protecting the rights of gun 
owners is relevant only inasmuch as it factors into constitutional 
analysis—for example in resolving a Second Amendment or Due Process 
Clause challenge.  
One final implication of the proxy-based approach to class restrictions 
is worth noting. Under federal law, the classes of persons prohibited from 
owning arms are basically adjudicated statuses—one cannot become a 
felon, or fugitive, or even mentally ill within the meaning of the statute 
without a court procedure to which basic due process protection applies. 
The tradeoff, then, is a thorough process the result of which is a poor 
proxy. As recent debates about “No Fly No Buy” and the rights of college 
students accused of sexual assault show, these due process concerns 
 
power is properly considered tyranny” and including “individual-on-individual tyranny” as 
one of the “categories of oppression with which the framers of the Second and Fourteenth 
Amendments were especially concerned”). 
137 See supra statutes cited in note 120.  
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continue to animate scholarship and case law about how to balance 
important competing interests.138 
2. Beyond “Law-Abiding, Responsible Citizens”: Risk-Based Gun 
Regulation 
In the closing paragraphs of his majority opinion in Heller, Justice 
Scalia rejected Justice Breyer’s argument that the constitutionality of gun 
regulations should be evaluated with attention to contemporary costs and 
benefits:  
Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood 
to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future 
legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope too 
broad. . . . The Second Amendment is no different. Like the First, it is 
the very product of an interest balancing by the people—which Justice 
Breyer would now conduct for them anew. And whatever else it leaves 
to future evaluation, it surely elevates above all other interests the right 
of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth 
and home.139 
This short passage invokes two interrelated themes: the reliance on 
history to determine the “scope” of the Second Amendment (including 
“the People” who can claim its protections), and the suggestion that the 
right is limited to “law-abiding, responsible citizens.”140 Extreme risk 
laws represent a challenge to this general paradigm.  
Second Amendment law and scholarship is, in many ways, backward-
looking. This is in part a natural implication of Heller, which blessed as 
constitutional a number of “longstanding prohibitions,” including 
restrictions on possession of firearms by felons and those adjudicated as 
mentally ill.141 The apparent suggestion that those prohibitions are 
 
138 See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text (describing the debate over No Fly No 
Buy); H. Hunter Bruton, Cross-Examination, College Sexual-Assault Adjudications, and the 
Opportunity for Tuning Up the “Greatest Legal Engine Ever Invented,” 27 Cornell J.L. & Pub. 
Pol’y 145, 147 (2017) (exploring “tradeoffs involved in requiring or rejecting cross-
examination” in sexual assault hearings).  
139 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008) (second emphasis added).  
140 Id. at 644 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (“[W]hen it finally drills down on 
the substantive meaning of the Second Amendment, the [majority] limits the protected class 
to ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens.’”). 
141 Id. at 626 (majority opinion) (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill . . . .”).  
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constitutional because of their lineage has inspired efforts to excavate 
their history—to understand how and why, for example, certain 
categories of criminals were prohibited from having firearms.142 The 
historical approach faces serious complications, which we cannot fully 
examine here. Federal law denies firearms to those convicted of domestic 
violence, for example, and that law has been—to our knowledge—
universally upheld.143 But a narrow search for specifically analogous 
historical predicates might call that law into question,144 especially 
considering that the law was egregiously slow to criminalize intimate-
partner violence against women.145 Courts and commentators often 
sidestep those challenges by deriving broad principles from specific 
historical examples—a tradition of denying firearms to the unvirtuous or 
the dangerous, for example.146  
Perhaps the central animating theme is the focus on “law-abiding 
citizens” who want to use their arms for traditionally lawful purposes. 
This is evident in doctrine. As noted above, the Heller majority 
announced that the Second Amendment “surely elevates above all other 
interests the right of law-abiding responsible citizens to use arms in 
defense of hearth and home.”147 And even the category of “dangerous and 
unusual” weapons that are subject to legal prohibition is defined in 
contradistinction to those weapons “typically possessed by law-abiding 
citizens for lawful purposes.”148 
But the “law-abiding” frame is even more prominent in political 
rhetoric about guns. Gun rights advocates regularly voice concern that 
 
142 See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 92, at 717.  
143 See, e.g., Stimmel v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 198, 201 (6th Cir. 2018); United States v. White, 
593 F.3d 1199, 1205–06 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 645 (7th Cir. 
2010) (en banc); United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1139–41 (9th Cir. 2013). 
144 Carolyn B. Ramsey, Firearms in the Family, 78 Ohio State L.J. 1257, 1301 (2017) 
(“Historical support for the exclusion of domestic violence offenders from Second 
Amendment protection appears rather thin.”). 
145 See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 
Yale L.J. 2117, 2121–42 (1996). 
146 See, e.g., United States v. Bena, 664 F.3d 1180, 1184 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Although persons 
restricted by § 922(g)(8) need not have been convicted of an offense involving domestic 
violence, this statute—like prohibitions on the possession of firearms by violent felons and 
the mentally ill—is focused on a threat presented by a specific category of presumptively 
dangerous individuals.”). 
147 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008); see also id. at 644 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“[W]hen it finally drills down on the substantive meaning of the Second 
Amendment, the [majority] limits the protected class to ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens.’”). 
148 Id. at 625 (majority opinion).  
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gun regulations will disarm or otherwise burden law-abiding citizens 
rather than the criminals who will never comply with gun regulations 
anyway.149 The “law-abiding citizens” frame carries within it a lot of 
freighted meanings, of course, which helps account for its political power 
and value.150  
ERPOs provide a useful means to unpack the assumptions and 
complications of this framing, because a person subject to an ERPO might 
be both law-abiding and “responsible.” On the one hand, that might be 
thought to raise constitutional concerns. But on closer examination, it 
shows why the “law-abiding, responsible” frame is simply inapt for 
answering hard questions about the constitutionality of gun laws. 
It is clear that the “law-abiding” line is not sufficient to account for the 
range of existing class-based prohibitions. Age-based restrictions, for 
example, are of course not predicated on violations of the law, nor are 
those that apply to people who have been civilly committed due to mental 
illness. The most intuitive underlying concern for those prohibitions is a 
risk of danger,151 and courts have overwhelmingly upheld them.152 
Extreme risk laws fit naturally into the same kind of category. The frame 
is safety rather than punishment; ex ante rather than ex post. 
One possible response is that this is what Justice Scalia meant by 
emphasizing the word “responsible”—even if law-abiding, minors as a 
class are too irresponsible to be trusted with firearms in the same way as 
adults.153 That principle could help explain the constitutional treatment of 
minors and perhaps other persons who are “law-abiding” and yet can be 
 
149 See, e.g., Cox, supra note 25.  
150 See Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 
122 Harv. L. Rev. 191, 239 (2008). 
151 See, e.g., United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that the federal 
ban on juvenile handgun possession is “part of a longstanding practice of prohibiting certain 
classes of individuals from possessing firearms—those whose possession poses a particular 
danger to the public”). 
152 See also Horsley v. Trame, 808 F.3d 1126, 1133–34 (7th Cir. 2015) (upholding Illinois 
statute requiring written consent of parent or guardian for persons under age twenty-one to 
own a firearm); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & 
Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 208–09 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding law restricting ability of persons 
under age twenty-one to purchase firearms from certain sources).  
153 See Amit Vora, Defending an Under-21 Firearm Ban Under the Second Amendment 
Two Step, 71 Stan. L. Rev. Online 1, 2 (2018) (arguing that the above-cited decisions present 
“historical evidence that, according to the Framers, only those with adequate ‘civic virtue’ are 
worthy of wielding lethal weapons, and one’s capacity for virtue grows with age”). 
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denied firearms: Heller’s specific carve-out for the “mentally ill” is a 
prime example.154 
The difficult question is what it means to be “responsible” in a legally 
relevant sense. This question has not yet received sustained attention in 
the context of gun rights and regulation, but of course it has long been 
fundamental to other areas of law. In torts, to take perhaps the most 
obvious example, judges and scholars have long connected 
responsibility—in the sense of legal duty or liability—and risk.155 Might 
ERPOs be understood, at least in part, through a similar lens?  
In some sense, the answer is obvious: The basis of an extreme risk order 
is, of course, a showing of risk. This basic feature has important 
consequences for both how such laws are received politically and how 
they are treated constitutionally. As noted above, standard gun 
regulations—including those that are both popular and constitutional—
deny guns to people who have, for example, committed a felony or been 
adjudicated mentally ill. Even those skeptical of gun regulation tend not 
to object to these laws (except perhaps as applied in particular cases156). 
The acts and adjudication accompanying such designations are generally 
considered sufficient proof that the person is either too dangerous or too 
unvirtuous to possess a firearm.157  
Some, however, believe that extreme risk laws present a different 
problem, since they are based solely on predictions about future 
violence.158 Critics often invoke the movie Minority Report, in which a 
“PreCrime” department arrests people based on psychic predictions about 
 
154 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).  
155 See, e.g., Jules Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (1992); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts 
on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499, 499 (1961); Stephen G. Gilles, 
Causation and Responsibility After Coase, Calabresi and Coleman, 16 Q.L.R. 255, 255 (1996) 
(arguing for “a conception of causation as risk-creation and a conception of responsibility as 
risk-avoidability”).  
156 See, e.g., Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 348 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (permitting 
as-applied challenges to felon prohibitor in limited circumstances); Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. 
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 686, 690 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (permitting as-applied 
challenges to mental illness prohibitor in limited circumstances). 
157 Charles, supra note 62, at 17. 
158 See, e.g., Dershowitz, supra note 109. But see David French, Red-Flag Laws—Yes, We 
Limit Liberty When There’s Evidence of a Threat, Nat’l Rev. (Aug. 7, 2019), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/red-flag-laws-yes-we-limit-liberty-when-theres-
evidence-of-a-threat/ [https://perma.cc/YT2R-VLJB] (noting and critiquing this point). 
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their likelihood of committing crimes.159 The suggestion is that gun 
owners should not be “punished” for things they have not yet done.  
But both of those premises are flawed: the analogy to crime is 
inapposite, and the suggestion that extreme risk laws are based on 
mindreading is misleading. Although the consequence (denial of access 
to a firearm) might be significant, extreme risk laws are a civil proceeding 
designed to protect both the gun owner and those close to him or her. So 
long as it is complied with, the order carries no criminal sanctions, and 
there is no situation in which “gun owners are presumed to be guilty and 
must then prove their innocence.”160 Of course, constitutional protections 
apply in the civil context as well as the criminal context, but the relevant 
protections have to do with due process rather than constitutional criminal 
procedure rights.161 The rhetoric of criminal law is unhelpful in 
understanding or resolving those civil due process issues. 
So, too, is it unhelpful to compare extreme risk procedures to a kind of 
mindreading. Extreme risk laws focus on risky behaviors, not imputed 
mental states.162 And there is nothing unique or unconstitutional about 
that. The law regularly imposes restrictions on people who have not 
committed crimes, based in part on the risk that they might do so in the 
future. Domestic violence restraining orders, for example, are granted 
based on a showing of risk—one need not wait until a crime has been 
committed (or, for that matter, adjudicated).163 A person who does 
 
159 Minority Report (DreamWorks 2002). The movie is based on a short story by Philip K. 
Dick. See Philip K. Dick, The Minority Report, in The Philip K. Dick Reader 323, 324 (1997). 
160 Niño, supra note 57. Some critics of extreme risk laws have wrongly suggested that the 
burden is on the gun owner. See, e.g., Mica Soellner, Wisconsin Assembly Speaker’s New 
Take on Red-Flag Gun Laws Still Misses Target, PolitiFact (Dec. 6, 2019), 
https://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/statements/2019/dec/06/robin-vos/wisconsin-assemb 
ly-speakers-new-take-red-flag-gun-/ [https://perma.cc/M4VR-FH6E]. For a discussion of the 
burden of proof, which always rests with the petitioner, see infra Subsection II.B.2. 
161 See, e.g., Tony Lovasco, ‘Red Flag Laws’ Violate More Than Just Gun Rights, Hill (Aug. 
12, 2019), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/457058-red-flag-laws-violate-
more-than-just-gun-rights [https://perma.cc/XG9X-9G7U] (listing, inter alia, the Con-
frontation Clause and the protection against unreasonable search and seizures as among the 
rights that are “explicitly violated under red flag laws”). 
162 Florida’s law, to take one example, points to a list of fifteen factors like acts or threats of 
violence, violation of prior orders, domestic violence convictions, abuse of controlled 
substances, and the like. See Fla. Stat. § 790.401(3)(c) (2019).  
163 For example, in Wisconsin, a temporary restraining order or injunction may be issued 
where the petition alleges facts sufficient to show “[t]hat the respondent engaged in, or based 
on prior conduct of the petitioner and the respondent may engage in, domestic abuse of the 
petitioner.” Wis. Stat. § 813.12(5)(a) (2017–18).  
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commit a crime can be subject to post-sentencing confinement based on 
“clear and convincing evidence” (not evidence beyond a reasonable 
doubt) that he or she is mentally ill and dangerous.164 The fact that these 
kinds of orders are constitutional shows that constitutional interests can 
be restricted even without a criminal proceeding.  
To return to the question, then: ERPOs fit uncomfortably with the 
frame that “law-abiding” persons are immune to gun regulation, but that 
shows the weakness of the frame, which cannot account even for basic 
(and constitutional) limitations on minors and the mentally ill. The 
addition of the “responsible” frame helps—not because of a normative 
judgment about moral desert, but by connecting responsibility and risk. 
That is something that the law does in many different contexts, but 
foregrounding it in the context of gun regulation (as separated from law-
abidingness) may represent something of a paradigm shift for the gun 
debate. 
It also presents a new set of constitutional concerns and questions 
rooted not in historical analogy—the typical focus of the gun debate—but 
in due process. If risk is to be the basis for disarmament, what does the 
Constitution require in terms of how that risk is shown? It is to that 
question we now turn.  
II. DUE PROCESS AND EXTREME RISK LAWS 
Part I canvassed the framework for extreme risk laws. Such laws vary 
from state to state, and each state provides different methods and 
mechanisms for seeking, sustaining, and enforcing such laws. The laws 
aim to balance the need to keep dangerous persons away from firearms 
with the recognition that firearm ownership and possession are 
fundamental property and liberty interests. This Part focuses on the 
constitutional questions that extreme risk procedures raise, and in 
particular on whether those laws comply with the requirements of the Due 
Process Clause. 
It is important to be clear at the outset about the scope of inquiry. The 
question is not whether the government can ever take firearms away, but 
what the government needs to do and show before it can.165 As the 
 
164 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d) (2018) (permitting civil commitment based on diagnosis 
of mental condition). 
165 To be sure, there are some gun rights advocates who simply believe guns are an 
untouchable constitutional entitlement not subject to divestment at all. See, e.g., Rachel 
Malone, There Isn’t Enough Due Process To Make Red Flag Laws Tolerable, Gun Owners of 
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Supreme Court has said, “[p]rocedural due process rules are meant to 
protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or 
unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.”166 The rules that 
courts impose on government actors seek to balance the individual and 
governmental interests in light of the risks of an erroneous deprivation. 
Those rules have to be flexible: there is no formulaic answer to what due 
process demands before the government may seize property or infringe a 
liberty interest.167 At its core, due process requires notice and a hearing, 
and it requires the government to provide certain protections during the 
hearing to guard against wrongful deprivations. This Part examines the 
two issues most salient to extreme risk laws: (1) the rules governing 
deprivation prior to a full hearing, and (2) the burden of proof the State 
imposes on the petitioner before granting an ERPO. We conclude that 
extreme risk laws can meet both of these demands. 
A. Constitutional Requirements for Pre-Hearing Deprivations 
The fundamental requirements of due process are notice and an 
opportunity to be heard.168 In normal cases, these must occur before the 
government deprives an individual of constitutionally protected liberty or 
 
Am. (Aug. 16, 2019), https://gunowners.org/there-isnt-enough-due-process-to-make-red-flag-
laws-tolerable/ [https://perma.cc/YY9W-UHX2] (“No matter how much procedural due 
process you add in (i.e., give notice, let the accused have an attorney, hear charges against 
him, and defend himself in court), red flag laws still lacks [sic] substantial due process (i.e. 
it’s wrong to have guns taken away based on a future prediction).”). But, as the Supreme Court 
has held, “substantive due process” concerns with regulatory and not punitive government 
action can yield to important and compelling interests. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 
U.S. 739, 748 (1987) (upholding pretrial detention of those charged with certain crimes and 
noting that the Court has “repeatedly held that the Government’s regulatory interest in 
community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual’s liberty 
interest”). This Article does not address any potential substantive due process arguments about 
extreme risk laws; those are likely coterminous with the merits of any Second Amendment 
challenge.  
166 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978).  
167 Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894–95 (1961) (“The very 
nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to 
every imaginable situation.”); John V. Orth, Due Process of Law: A Brief History 5 (2003) 
(“One of the most frequently asked questions in American constitutional history has been, 
what is required by the constitutional guarantee of ‘due process of law’?”). 
168 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“The fundamental requirement of due 
process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” 
(citations omitted)); see also Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 Yale 
L. & Pol’y Rev. 1, 12 (2006) (“The default rule is that notice and a hearing must be provided 
before the government takes adverse action, except in exigent circumstances.”).  
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property.169 “Due process, however, does not always require prior 
process.”170 The Supreme Court has long recognized “extraordinary 
situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies 
postponing the hearing until after the event.”171 The Court has described 
these “extraordinary situations” in various ways,172 but it has grouped 
them into two categories: (1) occasions “where a State must act quickly” 
and (2) those “where it would be impractical to provide predeprivation 
process.”173 The first category is exemplified in laws motivated by urgent 
concerns over public health and safety;174 the second by situations in 
which a government official negligently or carelessly deprives a person 
of his or her property, precluding any practical way to have provided a 
prior hearing.175 Extreme risk laws implicate the first category, on which 
the rest of this Section focuses. 
 
169 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 309, 329 (1993) (remarking that “[f]air pre-
deprivation procedures, which reduce the likelihood of erroneous deprivations of liberty and 
property, constitute one form of protection” of the Due Process Clause). 
170 Jordan ex rel. Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 343 (4th Cir. 1994) (upholding Virginia 
law permitting removal of a child from the parents’ custody before a hearing when necessary 
to prevent imminent harm). 
171 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971); see also Bd. of Regents of State Colls. 
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972) (“When protected interests are implicated, the right to 
some kind of prior hearing is paramount.”).  
172 See, e.g., Roth, 408 U.S. at 570 n.7 (“rare and extraordinary situations”); Fuentes v. 
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972) (“truly unusual” situations); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 
(1971) (“emergency situations”); cf. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 240 
(1988) (“An important government interest, accompanied by a substantial assurance that the 
deprivation is not baseless or unwarranted, may in limited cases demanding prompt action 
justify postponing the opportunity to be heard until after the initial deprivation.”).  
173 Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997); see also Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 
539 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (stating 
that “either the necessity of quick action by the State or the impracticality of providing any 
meaningful predeprivation process, when coupled with the availability of some meaningful 
means by which to assess the propriety of the State’s action at some time after the initial 
taking, can satisfy the requirements of procedural due process”).  
174 See, e.g., Rhonda Wasserman, Procedural Due Process: A Reference Guide to the United 
States Constitution 70 (2004) (“[T]he Court has permitted a deprivation of property without a 
prior opportunity to be heard when necessary to protect public health or safety.”). 
175 In this second situation, the government can still comply with due process even though 
no pre-deprivation hearing was held so long as it provides adequate post-deprivation remedies. 
See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 539 (describing this alternative); see also Susan Bandes, Monell, 
Parratt, Daniels, and Davidson: Distinguishing a Custom or Policy from a Random, 
Unauthorized Act, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 101, 108 (1986) (“[T]he random and unauthorized act by 
a state employee is the gravamen of the Parratt doctrine.”).  
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1. Supreme Court Guidelines for Seizures Prior to a Full Hearing 
In Fuentes v. Shevin,176 the Court identified three factors necessary to 
justify a deprivation before a full hearing takes place.177 First, in each case 
the seizure must be “directly necessary to secure an important 
governmental or general public interest.”178 Next, there must be “a special 
need for very prompt action.”179 And finally, in prior cases approving 
such seizures, “the State ha[d] kept strict control over its monopoly of 
legitimate force; the person initiating the seizure ha[d] been a government 
official responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly 
drawn statute, that it was necessary and justified in the particular 
instance.”180 As commentators have noted, the cases Fuentes cited that 
justified seizures prior to a hearing “involved immediate, irreparable, 
grave and widespread harm.”181 
Applying these factors, the Fuentes Court struck down state laws that 
permitted a creditor to institute an ex parte replevin action and gain 
possession of a debtor’s property prior to notice and a hearing.182 In the 
Court’s view, the interests in play were mostly private, there was no 
special need for quick action, and, perhaps most importantly, no 
government official made even “a summary determination of the relative 
rights of the disputing parties before stepping into the dispute and taking 
goods from one of them.”183 In other words, the challenged laws allowed 
a private party’s mere filing to trigger state-enforced deprivation of a 
property right. That mechanism did not comply with due process. 
Four years after Fuentes, the Supreme Court systematized its 
procedural due process jurisprudence, after commentators bemoaned the 
confusion generated by the due process boom of the early 1970s.184 In 
Mathews v. Eldridge,185 the Court held that a pre-deprivation hearing was 
not required before the government terminated a recipient’s disability 
 
176 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
177 Id. at 90–92.  
178 Id. at 91.  
179 Id.  
180 Id.  
181 Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process Requirements, 82 Yale L.J. 1023, 1028 
(1973). 
182 Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 96. 
183 Id. at 80. 
184 See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1276–
77 (1975).  
185 424 U.S. 319 (1976).  
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benefits. It announced three factors courts must consider to determine 
what process is due and when:  
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail.186 
Like the Fuentes factors, the Eldridge balancing test derived principles 
from the Court’s prior case law upholding seizures with no pre-
deprivation hearing and justifying future deprivations under certain 
conditions. That case law is more extensive than one might suppose. In 
fact, the Court has permitted the government to deprive an individual of 
a constitutionally protected interest without a pre-deprivation hearing in 
all of the following situations187: 
• seizing and destroying rotten food;188 
• issuing rent orders in defense area housing;189  
 
186 Id. at 335. 
187 Scholars have observed how courts have limited these exceptional situations to those 
involving a need for quick government intervention. See, e.g., Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional 
Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and 
Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 Hastings L.J. 1325, 1399 (1991) 
(describing the general due process rule and stating that “[s]ometimes, however, notice and 
opportunity to be heard can be postponed until after the seizure is effected,” but noting that 
“such a relaxation of the ordinary rule requires an ‘extraordinary situation’ and a ‘special need 
for very prompt action’” (quoting Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90–91)); Terrance G. Reed & Joseph 
P. Gill, RICO Forfeitures, Forfeitable “Interests,” and Procedural Due Process, 62 N.C. L. 
Rev. 57, 77 (1983) (describing the requirement for quick action before such pre-hearing 
deprivations can occur); Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process Requirements, supra note 
181, at 1026 (“The Court has carefully limited the scope of the ‘extraordinary situations’ 
exception under which the notice and hearing required by due process may be postponed until 
after seizure of property.”).  
Some have even criticized items on the canonical list because they do not seem sufficiently 
like emergency situations. E.g., Leslie Book, The Collection Due Process Rights: A Misstep 
or a Step in the Right Direction?, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 1145, 1181 (2004) (“The lumping of 
taxation together with other extraordinary situations, however, is not persuasive: although 
collecting taxes is crucial to the nation’s well-being, the need for speed that might justify the 
absence of a predeprivation hearing seems much more pronounced when considering 
government actions to destroy contaminated food or mislabeled drugs.”). 
188 N. Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 319–20 (1908). 
189 Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 505 (1944). 
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• placing a savings and loan association into conservatorship;190 
• confiscating mislabeled drugs;191  
• ordering the sequestration of a debtor’s personal property;192 
• seizing movable property prior to a forfeiture action;193  
•   terminating disability benefits;194 
•   suspending a driver’s license upon multiple infractions prior to a 
full hearing;195 
•   imposing corporal punishment on junior high students;196 
•   suspending a driver’s license for refusal to take a breathalyzer;197 
•   suspending a horse trainer’s license;198  
•   ordering an immediate halt to mining operations;199 
•   suspending an indicted official of a federally insured bank before 
any hearing;200 and  
•   suspending a tenured public employee without pay.201 
 
Consistent with the Eldridge factors, “[u]nderlying these decisions 
upholding deprivation of property prior to a hearing was a determination 
that the need for speedy government action to protect the public interest 
outweighed any private interest in obtaining the [full] trappings of due 
process prior to the property infringement.”202 Thus, in each of these 
cases, the Court has considered the government’s interest important 
enough to justify even “substantial” burdens on affected persons.203  
 
190 Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 247 (1947).  
191 Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 600 (1950). 
192 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 619–620 (1974). 
193 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 664 (1974). 
194 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 349 (1976). 
195 Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 110, 113 (1977). 
196 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977).  
197 Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 19 (1979). 
198 Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979). 
199 Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 304–05 (1981). 
200 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 232 (1988). 
201 Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 931, 933–34 (1997). 
202 Reed & Gill, supra note 187, at 77; see also Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process 
Requirements, supra note 181, at 1028 (“The explicit situations actually sanctioned by the 
Supreme Court for postponing notice and hearing have all exhibited threats to important 
government or public interests.”). 
203 Barry, 443 U.S. at 64 (“Unquestionably, the magnitude of a trainer's interest in avoiding 
suspension is substantial; but the State also has an important interest in assuring the integrity 
of the racing carried on under its auspices.”). 
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Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n is 
exemplary.204 There, the Court entertained a pre-enforcement challenge 
to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (“the Act”) 
on a variety of constitutional grounds. The plaintiffs challenged on due 
process grounds the provisions of the Act that required the Interior 
Secretary to order the immediate cessation of mining operations if the 
Secretary concluded that an operation “creates an [imminent] danger to 
the health or safety of the public, or is causing, or can reasonably be 
expected to cause significant, imminent environmental harm to land, air, 
or water resources.”205 If an aggrieved mine operator complained about 
this interference with its property, the Secretary had to respond within 
five days, and the Act provided for administrative review of the 
Secretary’s decision.206 In addition, a cessation order expired thirty days 
after issuance unless the Secretary held a public hearing.207  
In reviewing this scheme, the Supreme Court first noted the general 
rule about pre-deprivation hearings, but emphasized that it “has often 
acknowledged . . . that summary administrative action may be justified in 
emergency situations,” such as for the protection of public health and 
safety.208 And those exact concerns motivated the Act’s immediate-
cessation provisions, which the Court observed were passed in the wake 
of a tragic mining disaster in West Virginia that caused 124 deaths and 
left 4,000 people homeless.209 In other words, the Act’s provisions 
allowing for immediate cessation were “precisely the type of emergency 
situation in which this Court has found summary administrative action 
justified.”210  
Notwithstanding this recognition, the plaintiffs had argued that the Act 
failed to set forth a clear set of “objective criteria” by which the Secretary 
could issue a cessation order. The Court rejected that argument, finding 
that the statutory definitions of “imminent danger to the health and safety 
of the public” were sufficient.211 And the fact that some of the Secretary’s 
orders were overturned on review showed not that the Act’s criteria were 
 
204 452 U.S. 264. 
205 Id. at 298 (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(2) (1976)). 
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 299 n.42.  
208 Id. at 299–300.  
209 Id. at 300 n.44.  
210 Id. at 301.  
211 Id. (citation omitted). 
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flawed, but that its review procedure worked.212 “The possibility of 
administrative error inheres in any regulatory program; statutory 
programs authorizing emergency administrative action prior to a hearing 
are no exception.”213 
Applying this framework, lower courts have routinely upheld seizures 
prior to a hearing, even in cases involving extremely weighty—indeed 
fundamental—private interests, when the government’s interests in 
protecting public health and safety are at their zenith. Three examples are 
particularly illuminating because of the nature of the fundamental private 
interests at stake: (1) removing a child from a parent’s care and custody, 
(2) confining a person in psychiatric care against their will, and (3) 
imposing restraints on a person’s right to contact or be around another 
person or live in one’s own home, most often in the domestic violence 
context. 
First, courts have upheld statutes that permit ex parte orders authorizing 
government officials to remove minors from a parent’s custody and 
control when “immediate removal is necessary to avoid imminent danger 
to the child’s life or health.”214 Although custody and control of one’s 
children is “an interest far more precious than any property right,”215 the 
“ex parte order authorizing temporary custody with [the State] is 
permitted because of its short duration and the requirement of further 
action by the State before custody can be continued.”216 As one court put 
it, this situation justifies immediate action under the Fuentes factors 
because the State’s interest is so compelling and the children’s needs 
 
212 Id. at 302.  
213 Id.  
214 F.K. v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Polk Cnty., 630 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Iowa 2001). 
215 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982); see also Jordan ex rel. Jordan v. 
Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 342 (4th Cir. 1994) (“There are few rights more fundamental in and to 
our society than those of parents to retain custody over and care for their children, and to rear 
their children as they deem appropriate.”); F.K., 630 N.W.2d at 808 (acknowledging, in the 
course of upholding a statute permitting ex parte pre-deprivation removal, that “[t]he United 
States Supreme Court has consistently recognized that a parent’s ‘care, custody, and control’ 
of a child is a fundamental liberty interest given the greatest possible protection” (citation 
omitted)); In re Carmelo G., 896 N.W.2d 902, 907–08 (Neb. 2017) (“The interest of parents 
in the care, custody, and control of their children is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental 
liberty interests recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court.”). 
216 In re Carmelo G., 896 N.W.2d at 908; see also Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 954 F. 
Supp. 1056, 1061 (E.D. Pa. 1997), aff’d, 174 F.3d 368 (3d Cir. 1999) (“In most child custody 
cases, ex parte judicial proceedings satisfy due process because the government has a strong 
interest in protecting children from immediate abuse, and pre-deprivation process would 
insufficiently protect that interest.”). 
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require quick intervention.217 Still, “only an imminent danger to a child’s 
life or health can justify removal of the child without notice and a hearing 
first.”218 
Similarly, courts have upheld statutes allowing civil commitment 
orders after ex parte judicial determinations.219 These statutes temporarily 
take away a person’s liberty, forcibly confining a person against their will. 
They often permit this detainer “when any person appears to be mentally 
ill and an imminent danger to others or to himself or gravely disabled.”220 
Because of the exceedingly important liberty interests at stake, courts 
have carefully delimited the timeframe and reasons for which the 
temporary, emergency commitments can last before a hearing is 
 
217 Newton v. Burgin, 363 F. Supp. 782, 787 (W.D.N.C. 1973), aff’d, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974). 
The Newton court acknowledged that the third Fuentes factor was not met because individuals, 
and not government officials, could institute petitions, but it held that the due process approach 
must be flexible to meet the needs in the present situation.  
218 Paul Chill, Burden of Proof Begone: The Pernicious Effect of Emergency Removal in 
Child Protective Proceedings, 41 Fam. Ct. Rev. 457, 458 (2003); see also Doe v. Kearney, 329 
F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Consequently, courts have recognized that a state may 
constitutionally remove children threatened with imminent harm when it is justified by 
emergency circumstances.”). Indeed, in this context, courts have allowed state officials to 
remove children faced with imminent harm without even securing judicial authorization 
through anything akin to an ex parte proceeding. See Alyson Oswald, They Took My Child! 
An Examination of the Circuit Split Over Emergency Removal of Children from Parental 
Custody, 53 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1161, 1193 (2004) (describing cases and concluding that 
“[r]emoving a child from parental custody without judicial authorization, under emergency 
circumstances, does not violate parents’ procedural due process rights”); see also generally 
Mark R. Brown, Rescuing Children from Abusive Parents: The Constitutional Value of Pre-
Deprivation Process, 65 Ohio State L.J. 913 (2004) (tracing the history of emergency removal 
of children and arguing for its constitutionality).  
219 See, e.g., In re Daniel G., 320 P.3d 262, 273 (Alaska 2014); see also State ex rel. Doe v. 
Madonna, 295 N.W.2d 356, 365 (Minn. 1980) (“Although the state may have a compelling 
interest in temporary ex parte detention of persons dangerous to themselves or others, such 
detention is justified only for the amount of time necessary to prepare for a probable cause 
hearing before a neutral judge.”); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 388 (M.D. Ala. 1974) 
(“[W]here a person said to be mentally ill and dangerous is involuntarily detained, he must be 
given a hearing within a reasonable time to test whether the detention is based upon probable 
cause to believe that confinement is necessary under constitutionally proper standards for 
commitment.”). Some states even allow for temporary holds for forty-eight or seventy-two 
hours without a court order. Leslie C. Hedman et al., State Laws on Emergency Holds for 
Mental Health Stabilization, 67 Psychiatric Servs. 529, 530 (2016) (identifying eight states 
that allow for emergency holds with no court order).  
220 Curnow v. Yarbrough, 676 P.2d 1177, 1181 (Colo. 1984); see also Civil Commitment of 
the Mentally Ill, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1190, 1205 (1974) (“Recent statutory enactments appear to 
indicate a trend toward restricting involuntary civil commitment to the dangerous mentally ill 
and toward limiting the type and increasing the severity of harm necessary to support a finding 
of dangerousness.”). 
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required.221 But they have recognized that quick ex parte procedures 
withstand due process concerns.222 
Courts have even considered how such emergency civil commitment 
orders can affect firearm rights under federal law. In United States v. 
Rehlander,223 for example, the defendants challenged their convictions 
under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), which forbids anyone who has been 
“committed to a mental institution” from possessing firearms.224 The 
defendants had previously been involuntarily committed under Maine’s 
emergency commitment procedures after ex parte proceedings. They did 
not contest the constitutional sufficiency of that process, but argued that 
it would violate their due process rights to permanently deprive them of 
their Second Amendment right based on such a finding.225 The First 
Circuit agreed, and thus read the federal law to exclude such ex parte 
commitments.226 It noted, however, that “[t]his would be a different case 
if [S]ection 922 addressed ex parte hospitalizations and provided for a 
temporary suspension of the right to bear arms pending further 
proceedings.”227 In other words, the court recognized that suspension of 
firearm rights after an ex parte hearing would not violate due process so 
long as the suspension was temporary.  
Lastly, courts have upheld ex parte restraining orders that can 
considerably curtail a restrained person’s movement, behavior, and 
authority—including parental custody or visitation or even firearm 
 
221 See, e.g., Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, supra note 220, at 1265 (“In emergency 
detention, the short range goals are either to protect the individual from serious harm or to 
prevent him from inflicting immediate injury on others, and to confine him until a more 
permanent disposition of his case can be made.” (footnotes omitted)). 
222 See Richard C. Boldt, Emergency Detention and Involuntary Hospitalization: Assessing 
the Front End of the Civil Commitment Process, 10 Drexel L. Rev. 1, 13 (2017) (describing 
cases permitting postponement of a hearing when “immediate action may be necessary to 
prevent imminent harm to the restrained individual”). Here, as in the child removal context, 
courts have allowed such emergency detentions without even requiring any judicial 
authorization. Id. at 17 (recounting how courts have recognized that in this context “the state’s 
interest in protecting the safety of severely mentally ill individuals and the general public is 
sufficiently weighty to displace any entitlement to a preliminary judicial review of the grounds 
for an emergency psychiatric admission”). 
223 666 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2012). 
224 Id. at 46 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(4) (2006)).  
225 Id. at 47.  
226 Id.  
227 Id. at 49.  
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possession.228 These orders provide a useful comparison because many 
states have partially modeled their extreme risk laws on domestic violence 
restraining orders.229 Most states permit temporary domestic violence 
restraining orders to be issued ex parte upon sufficient proof that the 
person poses a serious risk of harm.230 And courts have recognized the 
unique factors that justify short-term ex parte deprivations prior to a 
hearing: 
The existence of exigent circumstances justifies dispensing with the 
requirement of holding a hearing before the ex parte TRO is granted. 
The availability of a prompt post-deprivation hearing (by way of a show 
cause hearing), combined with the fact that the petitioner retains the 
burden of proof during the hearing, ensures that the respondent’s 
interests are adequately protected.231  
In Kampf v. Kampf, for example, the Michigan Court of Appeals 
considered a husband’s due process challenge to his wife’s procurement 
of an ex parte order restraining him from contacting her, entering the 
property where she lived or worked, threatening to injure her, or 
possessing firearms.232 The court rejected his challenge. So long as the 
 
228 See, e.g., Kampf v. Kampf, 603 N.W.2d 295, 296 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (restrained 
husband argued the statute permitting an ex parte procedure was “unconstitutional because it 
deprives him of his property rights and limits his right to liberty by subjecting him to the 
possibility of arrest and prosecution without notice or procedural safeguards”); Blazel v. 
Bradley, 698 F. Supp. 756, 768 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (upholding Wisconsin statute allowing for 
ex parte petitions only when it “is construed to require a showing of imminent harm”). To be 
clear, ERPOs are not a substitute for DVROs, which—as noted in the text—cover not only 
firearm possession but also other matters like no contact provisions, counseling provisions, 
and other protections. Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for 
Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 801, 810 
(1993) (“Currently, all fifty states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico make civil 
protection orders available to victims of domestic violence.”). 
229 See, e.g., Giffords, ERPO, supra note 53 (noting that the ERPO process in most states 
“typically mirror[s] the domestic violence restraining order processes in their respective 
states”).  
230 David H. Taylor et al., Ex Parte Domestic Violence Orders of Protection: How Easing 
Access to Judicial Process Has Eased the Possibility for Abuse of the Process, 18 Kan. J.L. & 
Pub. Pol’y 83, 84 (2008) (recognizing that under almost all state domestic violence statutes “a 
victim of domestic violence may obtain an emergency ex parte order of limited duration” that 
“grant[s] various forms of relief, such as a prohibition of contact with the victim, exclusion 
from a shared residence, a prohibition of removing possessions from the residence, and 
physical care and custody of the parties’ children”). 
231 Hamilton ex rel. Lethem v. Lethem, 270 P.3d 1024, 1033 (Haw. 2012) (citations 
omitted). 
232 Kampf, 603 N.W.2d at 297. 
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statute requires prompt post-order notice and an opportunity to be heard, 
“[t]here is no procedural due process defect in obtaining an emergency 
order of protection without notice to a respondent when the petition for 
the emergency protection order is supported by affidavits that 
demonstrate exigent circumstances justifying entry of an emergency order 
without prior notice.”233 
And just like in the civil commitment context, courts have also 
analyzed how these domestic violence orders can affect firearms rights. 
In State v. Poole, the defendant challenged his indictment for violating an 
ex parte restraining order that required him to surrender his firearms.234 
The court noted that the right to keep and bear arms is fundamental but 
held that the risk of erroneous deprivation was mitigated by the short 
deprivation period (six days between the order and the hearing) as well as 
the requirement that the trial court find that a danger of domestic violence 
“clearly appear[ed]” from specific facts.235 Moreover, the State’s interest 
in protecting domestic violence victims was “clear,”236 and could not be 
effectively vindicated without ex parte hearings.237 
In short, the Due Process Clause protects against erroneous or wrongful 
deprivations of constitutionally protected liberty or property interests. But 
it does not erect insurmountable barriers. Though the situations justifying 
seizures prior to a full hearing are indeed “extraordinary,” those situations 
occur when the government needs to act swiftly to ensure public safety.  
To be sure, in those extraordinary situations justifying seizure before a 
hearing, courts are quick to emphasize that due process requires a “prompt 
post-deprivation hearing.”238 Yet “there is no obvious bright line dictating 
when a postseizure hearing must occur,”239 and the flexibility demanded 
 
233 Id. at 299; see also Brown, supra note 8, at 192 (arguing that a firearm prohibition 
attached to an ex parte order for protection does not violate procedural due process so long as 
the deprivation is temporary). 
234 State v. Poole, 745 S.E.2d 26, 28 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013). 
235 Id. at 36. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. at 37 (“Additional procedural safeguards, such as requiring a fully contested hearing 
before forbidding someone subject to an ex parte order from possessing firearms, would 
prevent the State from protecting victims of domestic violence at a time that those protections 
are most required. There is no way to protect victims of domestic violence that would provide 
a predeprivation hearing during the crucial period between service of the ex parte order and 
the ten-day hearing.”). 
238 See, e.g., Hamilton ex rel. Lethem v. Lethem, 270 P.3d 1024, 1033 (Haw. 2012). 
239 United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. 
Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 562 (1983).  
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by the due process inquiry requires a fact-bound determination of the 
interests and values at stake in a particular situation.240 Sometimes even 
lengthy delays satisfy due process if the government’s interest is strong 
enough.241 As one commentator has noted, “when the government 
deprives a person of a protected interest under exigent circumstances, that 
preliminary decision is made hastily. Afterwards, the government may 
need some time to gather facts to determine whether it should even seek 
to make the deprivation permanent.”242 In precisely these situations, 
“[t]he magnitude of the public interest in a correct decision counsels 
strongly against any constitutional imperative that might require overly 
hasty decisionmaking.”243  
Finally, it is important to underscore that the cases upholding child 
custody, civil commitment, and restraining orders do not concern criminal 
proceedings, although criminal proceedings might proceed alongside 
them. In other words, the government can, in many situations and for 
numerous reasons, deprive fundamental property and liberty interests 
without adjudicating a person guilty of violating the criminal law.244 The 
 
240 Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 924 (1997) (“Due process is flexible and calls for such 
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”). The Supreme Court has 
instructed courts to look at several different factors in assessing the delay: (1) “the importance 
of the private interest and the harm to this interest occasioned by delay;” (2) “the justification 
offered by the Government for delay and its relation to the underlying governmental interest;” 
and (3) “the likelihood that the interim decision may have been mistaken.” Fed. Deposit Ins. 
Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 242 (1988). 
241 Mallen, 486 U.S. at 242–43 (upholding a ninety-day delay).  
242 Wasserman, supra note 174, at 76–77. 
243 Mallen, 486 U.S. at 244. 
244 There are a variety of reasons why officials may seek to use a civil process instead of a 
criminal one. Mary Cheh describes some of those reasons in the context of civil protection 
orders, which carry over fairly well to the extreme risk context: 
First, the very process of getting a civil protection order serves notice on the offender 
that her conduct is in question, that the courts are involved, and that serious 
consequences may ensue if she keeps up her present behavior. This by itself may deter 
future abuse [or threatening behavior]. A CPO also can be an alternative to prosecution 
where, although criminal conduct plainly may be involved, the matter presents difficult 
proof problems, the victim is tentative about prosecution, or other facts—such as higher 
prosecution priorities—render prosecution impracticable or unlikely. 
Second, a civil protection order can be sought, indeed may have to be sought, by the 
victim. In jurisdictions where the prosecutor is unwilling to proceed against a batterer 
and where private citizens are prevented from initiating criminal actions, this option 
offers a self-help alternative. Third, once a civil protection order is entered, violation 
thereof triggers arrest. Fourth, the use of a civil protection order permits the court, in 
fashioning the precise terms of the order, to proscribe conduct—under pain of criminal 
punishment—that in itself is not a crime. For example, some civil protection orders 
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common objection that extreme risk laws are improper attempts at 
“[s]topping ‘future crimes’” is thus fundamentally misplaced.245 The 
government has the power to act swiftly to protect public safety without 
invoking the machinery of its criminal justice system, so long as it 
comports with the Due Process Clause in doing so.  
2. Extreme Risk Laws’ Ex Parte Procedures Fit Comfortably in the Due 
Process Framework 
One of the biggest flashpoints in the debate over extreme risk laws is 
the possibility that property can be seized before the gun owner receives 
notice or an opportunity to contest the order. All existing extreme risk 
laws authorize this kind of initial, ex parte order, though such orders have 
different burdens, procedures, and consequences than those issued after a 
notice and full hearing.  
Supporters argue that these ex parte proceedings are essential to 
address crisis situations in which a gun owner poses an immediate risk of 
harm to himself or others and yet is unavailable (perhaps because 
unwilling) to appear in court.246 The availability of a prompt post-
deprivation hearing means that the ex parte orders are only temporary and 
of a relatively short duration. Opponents argue that ex parte orders are 
particularly “Kafkaesque,” an endorsement of “the concept of stripping 
Americans of their constitutional rights in secret proceedings where they 
have no voice.”247 As one critic put it: “Someone can go to a judge, 
 
direct the abuser to vacate her home, have no contact with the victim, or stay off certain 
property. 
Cheh, supra note 187, at 1405–06 (footnotes omitted). In addition to these reasons, states may 
also wish to use other processes to avoid adding to the problems of mass incarceration.  
245 Thomas Massie & John R. Lott Jr., ‘Red Flag’ Laws Are the Wrong Solution to Mass 
Shootings, Nat’l Rev. (Aug. 12, 2019, 4:08 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/ 
2019/08/red-flag-laws-are-the-wrong-solution-to-mass-shootings/ [https://perma.cc/B6J2-5S 
SS]. For a critique, see French, supra note 158 (“There is no ‘pre-crime’ conviction in 
American law. You won’t face life in prison for homicidal ideation, but you might face an 
injunction. . . . In some circumstances you should lose access to firearms for a limited period 
of time. This is a reasonable response to evidence of a threat.”). 
246 Yablon, supra note 59 (explaining the position of a GOP state representative from 
Pennsylvania, who adopted every NRA-suggested edit to his extreme risk bill except the one 
doing away with ex parte orders).  
247 Hammond, supra note 93; see also Niño, supra note 57 (arguing that “due process rights 
are turned upside down, as gun owners are presumed to be guilty and must then prove their 
innocence”). 
COPYRIGHT © 2020 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
1332 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 106:1285 
declare you dangerous, and you won’t get a chance to defend yourself in 
court.”248 
But the real issue is not whether a gun owner will “get a chance to 
defend [himself] in court” but when.249 And as the prior discussion 
demonstrated, the Supreme Court has permitted these types of ex parte 
orders in similar situations involving fundamental interests when 
necessity requires quick action.  
In keeping with the due process principles discussed above, existing 
extreme risk laws tie the availability of ex parte relief to the types of harms 
the Supreme Court and many other courts have recognized as allowing 
deprivations prior to a full hearing. In Fuentes terms, the immediate 
seizure is “directly necessary to secure an important governmental or 
general public interest”;250 there is “a special need for very prompt action” 
in this context;251 and no seizure can occur without approval of “a 
government official responsible for determining, under the standards of a 
narrowly drawn statute, that it [i]s necessary and justified in the particular 
instance.”252 Another way to flesh this out is by looking to the three 
factors Eldridge introduced: the individual interest, the risk of error, and 
the government interest.253  
Under the first Eldridge factor, the private interest in firearms 
possession is undeniably important. Like the interests of parents in their 
children and individuals in their freedom from confinement and freedom 
of movement, gun possession is a fundamental constitutional right.  
Still, the “hardship imposed upon”254 a gun owner by a temporary 
deprivation should not be overstated. It is exceedingly unlikely that a 
short-term ERPO will deprive a person of the ability to effectuate the 
“core” Second Amendment interest in armed self-defense. Firearm use in 
self-defense is rare,255 and it would be striking were such a need to arise 
in the (up to) fourteen-day period that most ex parte ERPOs cover. 
 
248 Bandlamudi, supra note 52 (quoting Paul Valone of Grass Roots North Carolina, a gun 
rights advocacy group).  
249 Id.  
250 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90–92 (1972). 
251 Id. at 91.  
252 Id. 
253 See supra notes 185–86 and accompanying text. 
254 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 342 (1976). 
255 Philip J. Cook & Kristin A. Goss, The Gun Debate: What Everyone Needs to Know 21 
(2014) (“[T]here is one defensive gun use per year against an intruder for every 3,500 homes 
that keep guns.”). 
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Especially when a person is in the grips of a mental health crisis, or 
otherwise presenting a risk to herself or others, the odds of a successful 
self-defense action seem far lower than the odds of gun misuse. As Fred 
Vars notes, “A person suffering from delusions or hallucinations cannot 
be trusted to use a firearm defensively in an objectively reasonable 
fashion.”256 Thus, although the private interest factor points in favor of 
the gun owner, that factor should not be given undue weight.257  
Under the second factor, the risks of an erroneous deprivation in the 
context of a mistaken ex parte order are not entirely clear. Some evidence 
suggests that not all ex parte orders turn into full, final ERPOs. A 2015 
study of Indiana’s gun seizure law, focusing on 404 petitions filed 
between 2006 and 2013, found that “seized firearms were retained by the 
court at the initial hearing in 63% of cases; this retention was closely 
linked to the defendant’s failure to appear at the hearing.”258 Whether 
there is a causal link, such that participation is important to avoid error, is 
harder to say. A study of Connecticut’s law noted that of the 764 risk 
warrants served between 1999 and 2013, firearms were returned to the 
owner after the adversary hearing in only twenty cases, though 
researchers noted that data was missing for approximately seventy 
percent of the final outcomes.259 
More fundamentally, it is not entirely clear how one would measure 
whether initial ex parte orders are “erroneous.” Some have argued that the 
ex parte orders have a high “error rate” because, as observed above, the 
ERPO is not always maintained after the full hearing.260 But if the ERPO 
 
256 Vars, supra note 8, at 1650. 
257 This point becomes especially clear when comparing the potential harm to a gun owner, 
from a temporary removal to the sometimes severe and long-term harms possible in other 
situations where courts have sanctioned seizures prior to a hearing. See, e.g., Chill, supra note 
218, at 459 (detailing the “range and extent of harm” from unnecessary removals of children 
from their families, including psychological and financial harm, the potential for abuse in 
foster homes, and additional stresses on an overworked system). 
258 George F. Parker, Circumstances and Outcomes of a Firearm Seizure Law: Marion 
County, Indiana, 2006–2013, 33 Behav. Sci. & L. 308, 308 (2015). 
259 Norko & Baranoski, supra note 37, at 1618–19.  
260 See Red Flag Laws: Examining Guidelines for State Action: Hearing before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 5 n.1 (2019) (statement of David B. Kopel), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Kopel%20Testimony1.pdf [https://perma.c 
c/46CW-78CF] (stating that “[a]bout a third of gun confiscation orders are wrongly issued 
against innocent people” based in part on a misreading of Norko and Baranoski’s article). 
Compare this statement with other research. Swanson et al., supra note 72, at 193 (“Among 
cases with known outcomes at hearing, results were as follows: guns held by police, sixty 
percent; guns ordered destroyed or forfeited, fourteen percent; guns returned directly to the 
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is not continued after the full hearing, perhaps it is because a true 
emergency has abated. In that case, the ex parte order would have been 
both necessary (and therefore properly issued) and a significantly lesser 
burden than if a longer, more permanent ERPO was entered at the initial 
stage. And, as Richard Fallon has observed, due process analysis has 
taken on “a strikingly managerial aspect,” in which “[a]ttention 
centers . . . on whether decisionmaking structures are adequate to 
achieve, on average, a socially tolerable level of accuracy in the 
application of law to fact.”261 Even if there will be erroneous decisions 
that result in wrongly issued ERPOs in some number of cases, the focus 
is on whether the framework creates a system that minimizes those 
instances to an acceptable level.262 
In this context, the “social disutility”263 of an incorrectly denied ERPO 
will almost certainly outweigh that of an incorrectly granted one. A 
temporary, fourteen-day deprivation of firearm rights is unlikely to result 
in any physical harm or lasting damage, even if the court was wrong about 
the risk. But if a court miscalculates and fails to grant an ERPO where 
one is necessary, then permanent, irrevocable, and devastating 
consequences can follow.264 
Finally, under the third factor, the governmental and public interests 
are undeniable, and are tied to the speed of the hearing. The situations in 
which the Supreme Court has allowed the practice are precisely analogous 
to the extreme risk context—where “quick action” is necessary to thwart 
serious potential harm.265 Existing extreme risk laws only allow for 
emergency, ex parte relief if the petitioner can plead and prove that such 
quick action is necessary. In Delaware, for example, only law 
 
subject, ten percent; guns transferred to another individual known to the subject and legally 
eligible to possess guns, eight percent; other, eight percent.”); cf. also Hodel v. Va. Surface 
Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 302 (1981) (remarking that erroneous decisions 
do not undermine a law, because “[t]he relevant inquiry is not whether a cessation order should 
have been issued in a particular case, but whether the statutory procedure itself is incapable of 
affording due process”).  
261 Fallon, supra note 169, at 311.  
262 See Brown, supra note 8, at 197 (“Admittedly, mistakes can be made, and false 
complaints can be filed, creating a slight chance of an erroneous deprivation. But this chance 
of erroneous deprivation has existed since the creation of the first OFP statutes, because the 
nature of domestic violence often requires immediate action.”). 
263 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970).  
264 See, e.g., Wintemute et al., supra note 79.  
265 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. 
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). 
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enforcement can initiate an emergency process to obtain an ERPO, and 
they must allege (and prove) that the “respondent poses an immediate and 
present danger of causing physical injury to [him]self or others by 
controlling, purchasing, owning, possessing, controlling, purchasing, 
having access to, or receiving a firearm.”266 Similarly, in Oregon, the 
petitioner must prove that “the respondent presents a risk in the near 
future, including an imminent risk, of suicide or of causing physical injury 
to another person.”267 All other state laws permitting emergency relief are 
similar.  
In sum, the factors that have led courts to uphold civil commitment, 
child custody removal, and restraining orders with no pre-deprivation 
hearing support the practice of issuing ex parte ERPOs. But, just like in 
those contexts, the person deprived of property is entitled to a prompt 
post-deprivation hearing. Accordingly, the duration of ex parte orders in 
extreme risk laws is limited. Only three states allow ex parte orders to stay 
in place for more than two weeks.268 The rest are up to fourteen days or 
less.269 By comparison, some states impose waiting periods on some kinds 
of firearm purchases;270 to our knowledge, none have been struck down 
as unconstitutional.271 
The interest in having one’s firearms is significant, but the justification 
for delay and the confirmation of judicial authorization all point to the 
reasonableness of a short span of mere weeks before the final hearing. 
Because there is such an overriding interest in getting the question right—
it could have profound and devastating effects—the ability of either the 
State or a private petitioner to gather and marshal the evidence necessary 
to make its case “counsels strongly against any constitutional imperative 
 
266 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 7703 (1974).  
267 Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 166.527(6)(a) (West Supp. 2019). 
268 Those three states are California, Delaware, and Oregon. For a helpful chart, see  
Giffords Law Ctr. to Prevent Gun Violence, ERPO Procedures By State 
https://lawcenter.giffords.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ERPO_Table_2-26-20.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/BK2W-U6S7] (last visited March 26, 2020).  
269 Id.  
270 Brian Burns, Holding Fire: Why Long Waiting Periods To Buy a Gun Violate the Second 
Amendment, 7 Charleston L. Rev. 379, 399–400 (2013) (noting laws in eleven states). 
271 See, e.g., Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 2016) (upholding California’s 
ten-day waiting period for subsequent purchase). For an argument against the constitutionality 
of even one-day periods, see Burns, supra note 270, at 410 (arguing that “longer waiting 
periods—those extending beyond twenty-four hours—should be struck down as 
unconstitutional”). 
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that might require overly hasty decisionmaking.”272 Especially because a 
judicial officer makes the initial determination with the burden of proof 
on the petitioner, there is a lower likelihood of mistaken deprivations than 
in many other contexts.273  
B. The Standard of Proof 
Another crucial question for the due process analysis is what burden 
must be carried before a person is deprived of a legally protected 
interest—what the standard of proof is, in other words. The government 
cannot simply permit individuals or public officials to enter court, claim 
a right to relief, and then transfer or confiscate property without putting 
the claimant’s demand to the test.  
The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the 
Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to instruct the 
factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he 
should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular 
type of adjudication.274 
It also serves a symbolic function: “to indicate the relative importance 
attached to the ultimate decision.”275 Justice Harlan described how the 
burden of proof “reflect[s] an assessment of the comparative social 
disutility of each” type of error—false positives and false negatives.276 
Where we draw the line depends on the values at stake on both sides of 
the ledger. 
The focus of extreme risk laws is, as the name suggests, risk—that is, 
they permit guns to be taken away upon a sufficient showing, from an 
appropriate source, that a particular person is at risk of harming himself 
or others. The constitutional (and for that matter political) questions 
depend in large part on how that showing is structured, which in turn 
generally depends on what kind of order is being sought. In California, 
for example, a temporary emergency order can be issued if there is 
“reasonable cause to believe” that the subject presents an “immediate and 
 
272 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 244 (1988). 
273 See supra notes 258–60 and accompanying text. 
274 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
275 Id.  
276 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).  
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present danger” and that an emergency order is necessary,277 while an ex 
parte order depends on a “substantial likelihood” of “a significant danger, 
in the near future,”278 and a final (and lengthier) order depends on “clear 
and convincing evidence” of “a significant danger.”279 These varying 
standards of proof make it important to be precise about what kind of 
order is at issue.  
1. Principles for Establishing the Burden of Proof 
Questions about the appropriate burden of proof arise both at the stage 
of the temporary ex parte deprivation and when the full evidentiary 
hearing occurs. At the initial stage, the Supreme Court has held that a law 
satisfies due process when it requires the plaintiff to “satisfactorily 
establish[] probable cause to believe” that the statutory criteria for 
deprivation are satisfied.280 It has said, in the context of revoking a 
driver’s license, that “due process require[s] only that the prerevocation 
hearing involve a probable-cause determination as to the fault of the 
licensee.”281 In other cases, it has described the burden at this initial stage 
as requiring only “a substantial assurance that the deprivation is not 
baseless or unwarranted.”282 That, as the phrase suggests, is a fairly low 
standard.283  
 
277 Cal. Penal Code §§ 18125, 18145 (Deering Supp. 2020).  
278 Id. § 18150(b).  
279 Id. § 18175.  
280 Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979). 
281 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (describing the holding in Bell v. Burson, 
402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971)). 
282 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 240 (1988); see also Marentette v. City 
of Canandaigua, 351 F. Supp. 3d 410, 427–28 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (“[T]he substantial evidence 
standard appears to be appropriately suited to serve as a preliminary check against baseless 
administrative charges by ensuring that the record contains ‘reasonable grounds’ to support 
the charges at issue.”). 
283 Indeed, the standard can be met even without an independent, neutral arbiter reviewing 
the evidence. See Spiegel v. Ryan, 946 F.2d 1435, 1440 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting requirement 
for independent review and holding that an agency’s order imposing deprivation prior to a 
hearing met the Mallen standard based on “a combination of factors: the [agency] was required 
to meet specific statutory requirements before issuing the order, the decision to issue the order 
was made by the head of the agency expert in these matters, and his decision was supported 
by detailed findings of [the defendant’s] misconduct following a long investigation by the 
[agency’s] examiners, the results of which were submitted to the district court under penalty 
of perjury”); Jordan ex rel. Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 349 (4th Cir. 1994) (upholding 
statute permitting child removal for up to seventy-two hours before even ex parte judicial 
review could be obtained and stating that “[e]specially given the enormity of the potential 
consequences of an erroneous return of a child to an abusive family, we cannot say that the 
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Once the full evidentiary hearing occurs, the burden continues to rest 
with the person seeking to continue the deprivation. What that final 
burden should be is a function of the Eldridge calculus, under which the 
court considers the private and public interests and the risk of error.284 
The Supreme Court has also employed a special focus in answering 
burden-of-proof questions, looking to factors such as “the nature of the 
private interest at stake; the standard of proof applied by a majority of 
states in that kind of case; the role of the state in the litigation; and the 
nature of the issues to be decided in the proceeding.”285 
When the individual interest is extremely strong, and the deprivation is 
potentially permanent or indefinite, the Supreme Court has required a 
heightened standard. The Court has, for instance, unanimously concluded 
that due process requires a heightened standard before an individual can 
be indefinitely confined in a mental hospital against their wishes. In 
Addington v. Texas,286 the Court noted the continuum between the 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, used in ordinary civil cases 
where only money is at issue, and the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
standard, used in criminal cases, where “the interests of the defendant are 
of such magnitude that . . . they have been protected by standards of proof 
designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous 
judgment.”287 In between those two is the clear-and-convincing standard, 
used for allegations of quasi-criminal wrongdoing (e.g., fraud) or when 
“particularly important individual interests” are at stake.288 
In Addington, the Court settled on the intermediate standard—clear and 
convincing evidence.289 The individual interests were substantial,290 and 
“[a]t one time or another every person exhibits some abnormal behavior 
which might be perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental or 
emotional disorder.”291 That could lead to erroneous results that weigh in 
favor of a heightened standard. But the highest, beyond-a-reasonable-
 
requirements of procedural due process demand more where a removal is effected shortly 
before or during a weekend”); cf. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys. v. DLG Fin. Corp., 29 
F.3d 993, 1002 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that the trial court ruling that the plaintiff had 
presented “a prima facie showing” of its right to relief satisfied Mallen). 
284 See supra notes 185–86 and accompanying text.  
285 Wasserman, supra note 174, at 103–04.  
286 441 U.S. 418 (1979).  
287 Id. at 423. 
288 Id. at 424.  
289 Id. at 431–33.  
290 Id. at 425–26.  
291 Id. at 426. 
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doubt standard was not warranted for at least three reasons: (1) the State 
was not acting punitively, to punish the mentally ill, (2) that standard has 
historically been confined to criminal contexts, and (3) the question at 
issue in commitment contexts is not the same sort of straightforward 
factual question at issue in criminal cases.292 On this last point, the Court 
underscored the difficult assessment required here: 
Whether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to either himself 
or others and is in need of confined therapy turns on the meaning of the 
facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and 
psychologists. Given the lack of certainty and the fallibility of 
psychiatric diagnosis, there is a serious question as to whether a state 
could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is both 
mentally ill and likely to be dangerous.293 
As a result, the intermediate standard best protected the competing 
interests. 
Likewise, the Court has mandated this heightened standard when 
dealing with other significant private interests that can be deprived 
permanently. In Santosky v. Kramer,294 it stated that “[b]efore a State may 
sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural 
child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least 
clear and convincing evidence.”295 There again, however, the Court 
recognized the sensitive and nuanced judgments that made requiring the 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard unwise.296 And it noted how the 
majority of states considered the intermediate, clear-and-convincing 
standard the most appropriate.297 Similarly, in Woodby v. INS,298 the Court 
held that in deportation proceedings, the government must “establish the 
facts supporting deportability by clear, unequivocal, and convincing 
evidence.”299 
 
292 Id. at 427–29.  
293 Id. at 429.  
294 455 U.S. 745 (1982).  
295 Id. at 747–48. 
296 Id. at 769 (“Like civil commitment hearings, termination proceedings often require the 
factfinder to evaluate medical and psychiatric testimony, and to decide issues difficult to prove 
to a level of absolute certainty, such as lack of parental motive, absence of affection between 
parent and child, and failure of parental foresight and progress.”).  
297 Id. 
298 385 U.S. 276 (1966).  
299 Id. at 277. 
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2. The Burden of Proof in the Extreme Risk Context 
The foregoing cases show that the Court has required heightened 
standards of proof when important interests can be completely deprived. 
But the Court has rejected calls to impose the highest burden in the civil 
context, even for liberty interests the Court has described as the most 
central and compelling.300 The question, then, is how the mix of 
government and private interests affects the standard that should govern 
at both stages of the inquiry of the ERPO process. 
At the ex parte stage, a low standard that recognizes the potentially 
catastrophic consequences of a wrong decision in failing to grant a 
warranted ERPO makes the most sense. The imposition on the gun owner 
is very short, and the requirement for judicial authorization minimizes 
many of the possible harms. Nonetheless, as commentators note in the 
domestic violence context, the potential for abuse makes it “incumbent 
upon courts to treat orders of protection as they would any other request 
for ex parte relief and ensure that relief be granted only when necessary 
to prevent the risk of immediate and irreparable injury.”301  
In current state laws, the most common standard of proof for ex parte 
orders is reasonable, probable, or good cause of an imminent risk.302 In 
four other states, the standard is preponderance of the evidence,303 and in 
one (Oregon), the evidence must be clear and convincing.304 All of these 
statutes require the decision to be made by a judicial officer.305 They 
mirror the ex parte requirements in many domestic violence restraining 
order statutes and other similar contexts.306 The convergence of states on 
 
300 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979) (“We conclude that it is unnecessary to 
require states to apply the strict, criminal standard.”); Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769–70 (holding 
that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard is not required for termination of parental rights).  
301 Taylor et al., supra note 230, at 117. 
302 Giffords, ERPO, supra note 53 (listing eleven states and the District of Columbia 
employing this standard).  
303 Id. (listing Colorado, Delaware, Nevada, and Vermont).  
304 Id. This likely has to do with the fact that in Oregon, an ex parte order automatically 
becomes final if not challenged by the respondent. Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 166.527(7)(f) (West 
Supp. 2019) (specifying in the notice to a respondent that “[i]f you do not request a hearing, 
the extreme risk protection order against you will be in effect for one year unless terminated 
by the court”).  
305 Zick, supra note 8 (explaining that state extreme risk laws “expressly require a judicial 
order before removal of firearms”).  
306 See, e.g., Taylor et al., supra note 230, at 118–33 (cataloguing state domestic violence 
restraining order laws and showing standards for ex parte orders); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-
261(b) (2019) (prescribing, in the civil commitment context, the “reasonable grounds” 
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a fairly low standard of reasonable, probable, or good cause factors into 
the conclusion that such a standard is permissible. These laws probably 
satisfy the competing interests and implement the due process concerns 
for fairness and flexibility at the ex parte stage, where courts have only 
required substantial assurance that the decision was not unfounded or 
arbitrary.307 As the Supreme Court itself has upheld statutes requiring just 
“probable cause” at this stage, these procedures are likely adequate to pass 
constitutional muster.308 
As to the full ERPO, if the deprivation were permanent—and it is worth 
emphasizing that it is not309—there is almost no question that the 
considerations from Addington, Santosky, and Woodby would require use 
of the clear-and-convincing standard. The fact that the deprivation is only 
temporary—usually six months to a year, and subject to rescission—may 
mitigate the concerns from those cases.  
It is also abundantly clear that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard 
is not required. An ERPO is not a criminal disposition, and the Supreme 
Court has not extended that burden of proof outside the criminal (or 
criminal-like juvenile adjudication) context. And all of the reasons the 
Court adduced in Addington and Santosky to reject such a demanding 
standard apply equally here as well. As there, the conclusion as to whether 
an ERPO is warranted “turns on the meaning of the facts,” not simply 
whether those facts exist.310 That makes it extremely unlikely that a 
petitioner could meet the heavy burden demanded in a criminal 
prosecution. Even the NRA does not argue for a reasonable doubt 
threshold: “An order should only be granted when a judge makes the 
 
standard to authorize law enforcement to take a dangerously mentally ill person into custody 
for evaluation). 
307 See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 240 (1988); see also Marentette v. 
City of Canandaigua, 351 F. Supp. 3d 410, 427–28 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (“[T]he substantial 
evidence standard appears to be appropriately suited to serve as a preliminary check against 
baseless administrative charges by ensuring that the record contains ‘reasonable grounds’ to 
support the charges at issue.”). 
308 See supra notes 280–81.  
309 Some criticisms are predicated on the misunderstanding that ERPOs are permanent, 
when in fact even a “final” order is time-limited. See, e.g., Dershowitz, supra note 109 (“Red-
flag laws would be worth trying as a remedy for gun violence if they remained limited to 
temporary gun confiscation pending a timely due-process review.”). 
310 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).  
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determination, by clear and convincing evidence, that the person poses a 
significant risk of danger to themselves or others.”311 
Beyond this fact, however, there are hard questions about the 
constitutional minimum floor for the longer-term “final” orders. On the 
one hand, the constitutional right to firearm possession is undeniably 
fundamental. On the other, an erroneous denial can lead to no less 
catastrophic consequences at this stage than at the ex parte one. There are 
also questions not just about what the Constitution requires, but about best 
practices for ensuring adequate protection for compelling interests on 
both sides of the equation.312 The goal of this Article is not to bless or 
condemn particular state statutes or adjudicate their varying burdens of 
proof. But this Article does identify some considerations beyond the 
compelling private interests that courts will likely consider when 
confronting challenges to these laws. 
First, courts will look to the standard of proof applied by most other 
states. In twelve of the existing extreme risk laws, the standard of proof 
for orders after the adversary hearing is clear and convincing evidence, 
and it is preponderance of the evidence in five states and the District of 
Columbia.313 Courts might also look to the analogous domestic violence 
context, where many states permit entry of final orders of protection or 
restraining orders if the plaintiff presents “reasonable grounds”314 to 
support a claim or prove the case by a “preponderance of the evidence.”315 
As more states adopt extreme risk laws, the burdens they employ will 
inform the constitutional calculus.  
Second, courts will consider the role of the State in the proceeding. In 
some extreme risk laws, petitions are filed and orders are sought by 
 
311 Emergency Risk Protection Orders (ERPOs), NRA-ILA (Jan. 8, 2019), 
https://www.nraila.org/get-the-facts/emergency-risk-protection-orders-erpos/ [https://perma. 
cc/6P2R-CJ9S]. 
312 For example, Colorado’s extreme risk law provides the right to counsel for ERPO 
respondents, even though the Supreme Court has not held that the Constitution mandates the 
right to an attorney in civil cases. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-14.5-103(6)(g) (2019) (stating that a 
respondent must be informed that “[a]n attorney will be appointed to represent you, or you 
may seek the advice of your own attorney at your own expense as to any matter connected 
with this order”).  
313 Giffords, ERPO, supra note 53.  
314 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 813.12(4)(a)3 (2017–18); see also Fla. Stat. § 741.30(6)(a) (2019) 
(“Upon notice and hearing, when it appears to the court that the petitioner is either the victim 
of domestic violence as defined by s. 741.28 or has reasonable cause to believe he or she is in 
imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic violence, the court may grant such relief 
as the court deems proper, including an injunction . . . .”). 
315 See, e.g., 23 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6107(a) (West 2019).  
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government officials.316 In others, private individuals who stand in some 
special relationship to the respondent are allowed to petition without prior 
intervention from the State.317 Where the State is the actor involved, 
courts may require other procedural safeguards to balance the power, such 
as appointment of counsel (as Colorado’s extreme risk law provides)318 
or other levers of support to ensure the respondent’s rights are adequately 
protected. Or they might mandate that the State meet a higher burden of 
proof than an ordinary private litigant seeking money damages in a civil 
suit.  
Finally, courts will look to the nature of the proceedings, including the 
possibilities for error. Like hearings over the danger a child faces from 
allegedly abusive parents or the danger a mentally ill individual poses to 
himself or others, extreme risk proceedings turn on complex and nuanced 
judgments about concepts for which we lack perfectly predictive 
scientific evidence. As noted above, this notion points away from a 
demanding burden of proof that would make it impossible to vindicate the 
government’s compelling interest in public safety. And the possibility of 
an erroneous deprivation—while real and important—is no less 
substantial than the risk of an erroneous denial that leads to injury or 
death.319 
CONCLUSION 
Thus far, no court has declared an extreme risk law unconstitutional on 
any grounds.320 But the debates about extreme risk laws are likely just 
beginning, in legislatures, in scholarly discourse, and in courts. And those 
debates will be largely driven—both as a matter of policy and 
constitutional law—by considerations of what due process requires. Some 
experts, for example, have argued that “state red flag laws are generally 
consistent with procedural fairness” because they impose the burden on 
the petitioner, guarantee judicial oversight, and provide a prompt hearing 
 
316 E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-38c(a) (2019). 
317 E.g., Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-601(e)(2) (LexisNexis 2018). 
318 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-14.5-103(6)(g) (2019) (detailing the requirements for a temporary 
order, including notice to the respondent that for the hearing “[a]n attorney will be appointed 
to represent you, or you may seek the advice of your own attorney at your own expense as to 
any matter connected with this order”).  
319 See supra note 264 and accompanying text. 
320 See Foster, supra note 65; see also Caroline Shen, Note, A Triggered Nation: An 
Argument for Extreme Risk Protection Orders, 46 Hastings Const. L.Q. 683, 692–711 (2019) 
(canvassing relevant case law from across federal circuits).  
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that focuses on risk.321 Courts considering challenges to extreme risk laws 
so far have upheld them against Second Amendment and other claims,322 
and a Florida appeals court also recently rejected a due process claim. In 
Davis v. Gilchrist County Sheriff’s Office,323 the man who had a risk 
protection order entered against him claimed, among other things, that 
Florida’s entire extreme risk statute was unconstitutional. Although the 
court characterized part of his challenge as a “substantive due process” 
challenge, it spoke in terms that sound also in procedural due process 
when upholding the law: 
The statute . . . requires a hearing within fourteen days of a[] [risk 
protection order] petition being filed, thus affording a respondent due 
process and a prompt opportunity to resist a final order. Moreover, the 
statute incorporates an added due process safeguard by requiring 
proponents to meet the heightened “clear and convincing” burden of 
proof standard. Furthermore, the duration of the RPO may not exceed 
twelve months, and the statute contains a mechanism whereby the 
respondent can request early termination of the order. Finally, the 
statute clearly requires the listed factors be considered within a specific 
context—the threat of gun violence.324  
Because of these protections, the court rejected the constitutional 
challenge.325  
As extreme risk laws continue to spread, further constitutional 
challenges will undoubtedly follow. Our goal in this Article has been to 
illustrate the fundamental questions of due process that will be central to 
those challenges—and thus to the future of gun rights and regulation. 
 
321 Zick, supra note 8. 
322 See, e.g., Hope v. State, 133 A.3d 519, 524–25 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016); Redington v. 
State, 992 N.E.2d 823, 830–39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 
323 280 So. 3d 524 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019). 
324 Id. at 533 (citations omitted). 
325 Id. 
